First Shiloh
By
Chuck Veit
On April 6/7 of 1862, Confederate forces under General Albert Sidney
Johnston surprised and almost destroyed the Union army of Ulysses S. Grant at
Shiloh (Pittsburg Landing). That he did not annihilate Grant was wholly due to
the presence of the Union gunboats Tyler
and Lexington under Lieutenants
Commanding Gwin and Shirk (respectively). Both Grant and Lincoln openly
acknowledged that the Navy had saved the day; along with the battle of Malvern
Hill, this was one of two instances when Yankee gunboats intervened to literally
save a Union Army from utter destruction. Without the timberclads, Johnston’s
men would easily have been able to make good on their boast that they would
“water their horses in the Tennessee [River].” In fact, they came within one
eighth of a mile of doing so before the fire from the ships drove them back. The
Daily Delta,
a New Orleans newspaper, also recognized the contribution of the U.S. Navy when
it stated on April 18, that
"[the battle at Shiloh] has taught us that we have nothing to fear from a land invasion of the enemy if he is unsupported by his naval armaments. It has taught us that the right arm of his power in this war is in his gunboats on our seacoast; and that our only assurance of saving the Mississippi from his grasp is to paralyze that arm upon its waters." (emphasis added)
The story of the April battle of Shiloh is well-known, but there
occurred a smaller First Shiloh five
weeks earlier in which the same Navy gunboats “secured the beach” for
Grant’s arrival three weeks later. This was accomplished in the face of much
greater odds than those faced by Grant; ironically, the Union forces were
surprised in March just as they would be in April. The story is especially
interesting because detailed reports exist from both sides of the battle.
_____________________________________________
The Memphis & Charleston railroad crosses Bear
Creek at Iuka, Mississippi [see Strategic
Map] It is carried over that stream by an
eighty-foot long bridge that looked incredibly vulnerable to Northern Army and
Navy officers in the late winter of 1862. Destroying that bridge would be almost
as good as capturing Corinth, Mississippi itself – the “Crossroads of the
Confederacy” – where the Memphis & Charleston intersected the Mobile
& Ohio railroad. Only a short fourteen miles from Iuka, the town of
Eastport, Mississippi was the obvious spot to land troops bent on destroying the
Bear Creek bridge. This was apparent to officers both North and South.
That Union gunboats could traverse the Tennessee River
with apparent impunity was demonstrated in early February when three ships
steamed upriver to Florence, Alabama, destroying nine of the thirteen steamboats
they discovered below Muscle Shoals. The gunboats returned downriver, pausing
only to burn an abandoned Confederate camp at Savannah, Tennessee.
In mid-February the Yankee Navy returned to the river
in the person of Lieutenant William Gwin, in command of the U.S.S. Tyler.
Landing at Hamburg, Tennessee (just south of Pittsburg Landing) Gwin informed
residents that transports would land troops on the following day. This was a
deception, as Gwin’s orders were to attempt the destruction of the bridge at
Bear Creek. Ascending to Eastport the next day, excited locals informed Gwin
that the bridge was guarded by 3,000-4,000 Confederates; having only fifty
sharpshooters aboard, Gwin decided a greater force would be needed and so
dropped back downstream to Cairo, Illinois. Gwin had fallen prey to the same
manner of misinformation he had spread at Hamburg: although heavily guarded
nonetheless, the bridge was garrisoned by only 1,500 men of a makeshift brigade
composed of units newly arrived from eastern Tennessee.
In late February, ships and troops of both sides were
in motion along the Tennessee. Having convinced his superiors of the need for a
larger force to send against the Bear Creek bridge, Lieutenant Gwin once again
headed upstream. This time he was accompanied by the Lexington under Lieutenant James W. Shirk. Tyler was slightly the larger of the
two ships, displacing 575 tons to Lexington’s
448 and being 180 feet long by 45 feet of beam to Lexington’s 177 foot length by almost 37 feet broad; Tyler
could manage eight knots to Lexington’s
seven. Both ships drew six feet of water. Tyler
was more heavily armed than Lexington,
carrying 6 8” guns and a single 32-pounder to the latter’s 4 8” guns and
two 32-pounders. Tyler carried a
complement of 67 men; while unrecorded, that of Lexington
was probably of similar size. The ships also carried
“portions” of Company C (Captain Thaddeus Phillips) and Company K (First
Lieutenant John J. Rider) of the 32nd Regiment Illinois Volunteers
(sharpshooters). On the last day of February they dropped anchor to spend the
night off Savannah, Tennessee, nine miles north of Pittsburg Landing.
Almost simultaneously, the 18th
Louisiana
Infantry Regiment – under Colonel Alfred Mouton (1) -- departed Corinth,
Mississippi. Striking half their tents and leaving their Company K to guard the
remainder, they arrived at Pittsburg on Friday, February 28 after a grueling
two-day march. Mouton was under orders to monitor river activity at the landing,
which was the northern terminus of the road to Corinth. To do this, he had nine
companies of the 18th
(about 1,000 men) as well as the Miles Light
Artillery and a 500-man detachment of Mississippi cavalry.(2)
Pittsburg
Landing was the principal river shipping point in the 15th Civil
District of Hardin County.(3) The landing was originally settled in 1848 by the
family of Pittser Miller Tucker, called "Pitt" Tucker. He established
a frontier trading post that dealt largely in hard liquor. When other families
settled nearby, “Pitt’s Landing” became “Pittsburg Landing.” The number and placement of
buildings that made up “Pittsburg” in 1862 is a matter of conjecture. This
is not from a lack of information, but from an overabundance of conflicting
evidence. The Louisianans described it as “three log cabins and a pigsty”
and one period map shows all of these structures clustered at the foot of the
Corinth Road. This road cut through the hundred-foot bluffs to the river’s
edge. In an 1862 photograph of the landing (taken following the April battle),
there is a house on the bank below the bluffs. It does not appear to be a log
cabin, but rather a framed house.(4) Larry Daniel(5) places the
“three log cabins” along the road: one near the edge of the bluff to the
north, a second about a hundred yards to the west across a ravine, and the third
two hundred yards south of the road. Confederate Silas Grisamore’s diary entry
specifies “but two buildings, one
on the bank of the river, and the other about 200 yards back,” but this may be
due to the fact that this eyewitness was stationed in the ravine between these
buildings and never saw the house at the foot of the landing nor the one to the
south. There was “a cultivated field, two hundred yards wide and a half-mile
long, [running] along the back of the bluff; behind the field was a heavily
wooded area.”
Two
companies of the 18th Louisiana were stationed in the ravine between
the northernmost houses, while the remaining seven companies camped in the woods
behind the open field; pickets were set that evening near the mouth of Owl Creek
a mile and a half downstream. Neither camp could be seen from the river. On the
morning of Saturday, March 1st, the Miles Light Artillery arrived.
The battery was under the command of Captain Claude Gibson, and so was also
known as Gibson’s Battery. The captain posted two 12-pound howitzers under 2nd
Lieutenant Charles A. Montaldo along the river about 100 yards downstream
(north) from the landing and four 6-pound rifled guns under Junior 1st
Lieutenant E. D. Terrebonne 300 yards further upstream (south) on “a high and
conspicuous bluff.” This would put the guns on either side of the landing
itself, in a position to enfilade any ship trying to land, and able to direct a
plunging fire down from the heights onto any vessel passing by. It was a good
position – possibly the best point at which to choke off the Tennessee. As per
Federal reports, the two northern guns were sited near the log cabin atop the
bluff.
Departing
Savannah, Tennessee on Saturday, March 1st, 1862, the Tyler and Lexington headed
upstream, the Tyler in the lead. Just
before noontime the Confederate pickets at Owl Creek spotted the smoke from
their stacks above the trees along the river and spread the word that
“gunboats were coming.” At 12:00m the ships rounded Diamond Island and
steamed into view of Pittsburg Landing. Gwin and Shirk were unaware of the
Confederate presence. Atop the southern bluff, Lieutenant Terrebonne opened fire
with his rifled cannon at 1200 yards, making “a few shots which were doubtless
well-aimed, but which fell short of their mark some 200 or 300 yards.” Tyler
and Lexington cleared for action and
returned fire at 1000 yards. As the battle opened, Colonel Mouton rushed to the
scene and pushed a single company forward over the brow of the hill, ordering
them into “a rifle pit that was being made on the bank of the river in front
of our camp.” Unfortunately, this fieldwork was incomplete and offered scant
protection from the fire of the gunboats. Being in full view of the Navy gunners
and at such a range that their musket fire was ineffective, the company was
quickly withdrawn – “not however until two or three shots passed so close to
us that we could feel the wind raising the hair on our heads. Had one of the
shots been a couple of feet lower it would have enfiladed the company and
settled up the accounts of a good many of us.”
The
opposing guns exchanged fire for ten or fifteen minutes before the Confederate
gunners were "compelled to travel," their retreat due in part to the
fact that some of their guns were not returning fire! Lieutenant Montaldo (in
charge of the two 12-pound guns on the northern bluff) “withdrew his howitzers
without firing.” At his court-martial in April the lieutenant testified he
“did not have enough men or the proper implements to work his guns.”(6)
Grisamore reports
“a few well-directed shots from the boats caused the [main] battery to fall
back, whilst the two howitzers, from not being properly prepared, were not fired
at all, and all fell back into the woods.” From the other
side of the battle, Lieutenant Gwin
reported, “we had the satisfaction of silencing their batteries” as the
result of “exceedingly
well-directed fire.”
In his
defense, Montaldo – in addition to not being able to work his guns – may
have been getting more than his fair share of attention from the gunboats.
Although Grisamore comments only that enemy gunfire struck and burned a log
cabin,(7) Federal records describe this specifically targeted structure as a
“fortified house.” Rifle pits that the Rebels had started digging supported
this impression. From the river, the two-gun battery, the entrenchments, and the
infantry company rushing to fill them certainly suggested a fortified position.
The Union sailors were aware of both batteries, since they cite the correct
number of guns, but the “fortified house” and its entrenchments came in for
special attention.
Realizing
the importance of the position, Gwin and Shirk determined to land and ascertain
the full strength and purpose of the Rebels and to destroy the “fortified
house” above the landing. These works were newly constructed and could well be
the beginnings of a more major bastion. In preparation, the Navy guns pounded
the shore and surrounding woods for an hour with grape and canister. Recalled
Silas Grisamore, “Having never seen but our company and the battery, it is
presumed that they imagined the force on land to be small and to have
retreated.” Unbeknownst to the Union officers, Alfred Mouton had formed his
eight other companies in the safety of the ravine behind the bluffs and was
simply biding his time.(8)
Having
evidently hung downstream from Pittsburg Landing while shelling the enemy
batteries, the gunboats now “proceeded abreast of the place” and landed two armed
boats from each vessel, all the while covering the bluffs with fire.(9) Second Master Jason Goudy
commanded the boats from the Tyler
(with Rider’s Co. K) and was in charge of the whole landing party; Second
Master Martin Dunn led the boats of the Lexington
(with Phillips’ Co. C). All told there were about a hundred Union soldiers and
sailors. Under cover of the ships’ fire, the landing was evidently
uncontested.
Jason
Goudy led the naval demolition party directly for the “fortified house” on
the river face of the northern hill. Captain Phillips took the men of the 32nd
Illinois (and perhaps a number of sailors) toward the top of the hill to screen
Goudy and get a better idea of the scope of the fortifications.(10)
As
they crested the bluff, the fire of the entire 18th Louisiana met
them. Silas Grisamore’s diary described the reaction of the Yankees to the
Confederate ambush as a “precipitous rush” back to their boats, with the Louisianans
in close pursuit. But the Rebels did not have everything their way,
as the guns of the Tyler and Lexington
reopened fire. "As we rose the brow of the bluff, Corporal Huggins C.
Ensign, of the Orleans Cadets, fell, torn and mutilated by a [Navy] shell, his
left arm broken and left side torn out.” First Lieutenant John T. Lavery, also
of the Orleans Cadets, was shot through the thigh, but continued to fight on,
"having borrowed a Maynard rifle, he leaned against a sapling, and blazed
away as hard as he could" and 1st Lieutenant Andrew J. Watt of
Captain Huntington’s company "was struck with an iron ring of a grape
stand, which had glanced from a tree, bruising his leg very severely, but did
not prevent him from following up the fight."(11) Union Navy Lieutenant
Gwin’s report claimed that the “small force actually drove back the rebels
and held them in check until they accomplished their difficult object, which was
to discover their real strength and purpose, and to destroy a house in close
proximity to the place where the batteries had been placed.” He cited Second
Master Goudy for special bravery in the destruction of the house “under such
heavy fire.” The “precipitous rush” must have taken a bit of time, and it
is possible that the 32nd Illinois (with the help of the gunboats)
managed to slow the Confederate charge despite being outnumbered 10:1, allowing
Goudy time to complete his work Gwin’s report stated, “My thanks are due to
Captain Phillips, Lieutenant Rider, and their men for the gallant manner in
which, in the face of the enemy, they charged up the hill, drove back, and held
in check, the rebels until the boats' crews had effected the destruction of the
house designated. As Grisamore indicates, the Louisianans began taking
casualties as they reached the top of the hill – where they became exposed to
the guns of the timberclads. The Rebels would also at that time have been
silhouetted against the sky, making perfect targets for the sailors and the
Illinois sharpshooters. That they were feeling the effects of this combined fire
is suggested by Grisamore’s statement that his fellows would “fire from the
top of the steep banks and step back out of their sight, [i.e., over the edge of
the hill] whilst they were reloading their pieces.”
Just
as Goudy’s demolition team came under heavy fire at the house, so too did the
Confederates pay special attention to the crew of the Tyler’s
howitzer. This gun was under the command of Gunner Herman Peters “who
displayed the greatest coolness and courage, although exposed to the whole fire
of the enemy, all but one of his men having been wounded.” It is not clear
whether mention of “armed boats” means that howitzers were actually landed
or if they were fired from the decks of the ships. The photo of the Lexington seems to show that ship’s boat howitzer deployed on the
foredeck, where the gun crew would have been easy targets for the Rebel
infantry. Certainly the ships themselves came under heavy musket fire, and Gwin
singled out the civilian pilots Hiner and Sebastian for “their coolness under
such a tremendous fire of musketry, our vessel being perfectly riddled with
balls.” The Rebel fire also began to tell among the men of the landing party:
Seaman James Sullivan of the Lexington
fell dead, shot through the chest; Corporal John Hines of the 32nd
Illinois was also killed, and Orderly Sergeant Daniel Messick and Captain
Phillips were wounded. Among the Tyler’s
crew, Seaman Pleasant Gilbert went down with a leg wound (that would necessitate
amputation), Seaman Crawford T. Hill was hit in the forearm, Seaman John
Matthews in the shoulder, Seaman G. W. Shull in the back, and Seaman Robert Bell
in the arm and chest. Some or all of these men may have been on the hard-hit
crew of Gunner Peters’ howitzer. Two Lexington sailors and one from the Tyler would also be listed as missing in action.
In the
face of the Rebel onslaught—and having destroyed the house—the Union force
began to fall back toward their boats, “receiving in their retreat a most
terrific fire of musketry.” Grisamore recalled that, as the gunboats could not
get closer to the shore than 50 yards, it was a long pull for the Yankees in the
boats and ”they became good marks for our men.” The crews of the timberclads
poured fire upon the advancing Rebels. Gwin praised them in his reports as
having “behaved with the greatest spirit and enthusiasm.” Aboard the Tyler, First Master Edward Shaw and Third Master James Martin were
singled out for their efficient working of the batteries. All told, the Tyler
expended 95 shell, 30 stand of grape, 10 of canister, and 67 rounds of shrapnel;
the Lexington fired off 45 8-inch shell, 25 6-inch shell, and 16 stand
of grape.(12)
The 18th
Louisiana pressed on, firing several more volleys at the boats and at the
timberclads. Grisamore boasted, “the gunboats were wooden affairs, and our
riflemen silenced their pieces easily. Had the battery been present then we
could have sunk them or compelled a surrender.” This last claim certainly
could have been true, since the musket fire alone had riddled the ships, but the
Navy guns were far from “silenced.” Lieutenant Shirk reporting at this time
seeing “a shell from this vessel . . . take effect upon a field officer,
emptying his saddle and dropping three foot soldiers.” The identity of this
officer is uncertain: Grisamore states that Lieutenants Lavery and Watt were the
only officers hurt in the engagement, and their wounds (described above) sound
miraculously minor for being caught in a blast sufficient to unhorse them. The
man in question may have belonged to the artillery battery or to the Mississippi
cavalry (13) – or he may simply have been incredibly lucky.
Having
repelled the enemy landing, the Louisianans retired over the hill. The gunboats
fired a few more rounds and, receiving no answer, disengaged. A plaque in the
National Cemetery says they continued upstream to Florence, Mississippi, but
Gwin’s report of March 1st – which, since it described the
engagement, had to be written later that afternoon or evening – is datelined
“Savannah, Tennessee.” Evidently they dropped back downstream to offload
their wounded. Silas Grisamore confirms this by recording that “they floated
off down the river and did not use their engines until the current had carried
them a mile or more below the scene of action.” The battle had lasted three
hours.
Although
claiming victory, Colonel Mouton that evening withdrew his regiment inland about
three miles to a log Methodist church, keeping only a light picket in
observation at the landing. The name of the church was Shiloh. Colonel Mouton
and the 18th Louisiana received on the 8th of March a
congratulatory order from Brigadier General Daniel Ruggles at the behest of
General Beauregard (14) thanking them for “their brilliant success on their
first encounter with the enemy at Pittsburg, Tenn., on the 28th
ultimo [1st instant?], and the hope that it is only the forerunner of
still more gallant deeds on the part of the regiment."
Lieutenant
Gwin also claimed victory and, in fact, both sides had fulfilled their missions.
Gwin wrote, “I have to state that the result was entirely satisfactory. Their
batteries were silenced in a short time; the landing was effected; the house
destroyed; and we discovered from their breastworks that they were preparing to
fortify strongly this point.”
The
reconnaissance of Pittsburg Landing indicated that the Rebels had been in the
opening stages of constructing much heavier fortifications--two 32-pound cannon
lay unmounted near the battery, ready to be emplaced. And, as per Grisamore, the
rifle pits were only in the opening stages of construction. In the days that
followed, Lieutenant Gwin made frequent reconnaissances of the landing to ensure
that construction was not resumed. Had the Confederates managed to complete
these works and entrench their guns, Pittsburg Landing might have proven a much
tougher nut to crack, and the road to Corinth firmly closed.
Numbers
of killed and wounded on both sides remain a matter of conjecture, again from an
overabundance of records. Silas Grisamore claims, “Our loss was about a dozen
killed and wounded. The enemy report twelve killed and sixty odd wounded and
missing. The missing with three exceptions were all in the Tennessee River.”
Colonel Mouton recorded twenty-one casualties on the Confederate side and
thirteen among the Union force. Southern newspaper accounts listed seven men
killed and thirteen wounded. (15) Lieutenant
Gwin’s initial report (written at Savannah on the evening of March 1st) stated
“the enemy had suffered severely, as several bodies were seen on the ground
and many seen to fall.” On March 2nd, while on his way back
upstream to continue scouting the river, the lieutenant was permitted under flag
of truce to proceed a mile inland before being stopped by enemy pickets. He
counted nine dead and 100 wounded (many mortally) “in their camp.” (16)
His final estimate of Rebel losses was twenty killed and 100 wounded,
claiming, “they buried fifteen the evening of the engagement.” On the Union
side, the destruction of the fortified house and the battery came at a cost of
two killed, three missing, and six wounded -- but the Southerners claimed to
have found three dead and captured four!
The bluff on which the “fortified house” once stood is today a part of the National Cemetery in Shiloh National Park. A plaque at the edge of the cemetery marks the approximate spot where it stood. The bluff itself was levelled during the 1866 construction of the cemetery, but the spot where the second of the northern houses stood (two hundred yards behind the “fortified house”) is occupied by the lodge near the cemetery entrance. The ravine in which the 18th Louisiana sheltered unobserved from the guns of the Navy was filled in (probably with the top of the bluff) when the cemetery was built. Some of the expended naval ordnance was discovered during excavations in the park, causing some confusion as to why Union naval shells were being found in what was known to be the Federal line during the April battle; the March engagement explains this – what would later be the Yankee left was, in March, a Confederate position.
Notes
(1)
Full name, Jean Jacques Alexandre Mouton. On the Civil War’s outbreak in 1861,
he accepted the rank of captain in the Confederate army, was quickly promoted to
colonel, and founded the 18th Louisiana Regiment. Wounded at the [2nd]
Battle of Shiloh, Mouton returned to service as a brigadier general in the
Lafourche, Teche, and Red River campaigns. He died on April 8, 1864,
leading a Confederate charge at the Battle of Mansfield (in north Louisiana) —
which, despite his death, led to the greatest southern victory west of the
Mississippi River. Buried on the battlefield, his body was reinterred in
St. John’s Cemetery on April 24, 1867.
(2)
Probably from the 2nd Mississippi Cavalry
Battalion, which had been sent to Purdy, Tennessee a few days before the 18th
Louisiana arrived at Corinth. Records of the battle do not mention the unit
designation, but the 2nd Mississippi’s orders were to observe eastward toward
the river, which was only a dozen or so miles away.
(3)
It never was a town -- indeed, the entire 15th
Civil District could not boast of a town, a teacher, a physician or a preacher
in the 1860 census.
(4)
This may have belonged to W. A. Pettigrew, a
merchant known to have operated a storehouse on the landing.
(5)
In Shiloh:
The Battle That Changed the Civil War (see Sources).
(6)
The court concluded: "It appears from the
evidence that the company was not in a state of preparation either as to
discipline, numbers, instruction or appliances, thereby not only hazarding the
lives of the men entrusted to these officers, but the cause they were engaged in
defending." General Pierre C. T. Beauregard commented: "The evidence
in the case manifestly shows a degree of culpability and neglect of duty on part
of Captain Gibson which should have caused him to exercise more forbearance
toward Lieut. Montaldo. To have ordered the Lieutenant to the front with a
mounted stovepipe would have been an absurdity perhaps equal to but not greater
than with howitzers which it was impossible (as shown by the evidence) to
discharge." This reflected badly on Captain Gibson’s leadership, and the
battery was never again engaged against the enemy before its consolidation with
a Missouri battery at the end of June 1862. There is no record of where Captain
Gibson placed himself during the March 1st battle.
(7)
It was evidently not yet an integral part of the
defenses they had begun to make only the day before. Grisamore does not mention
that anyone was positioned inside the building.
(8) “We were immediately called to arms, and whilst the officers
were endeavoring to form their companies the shells were whizzing over our
heads, causing every one of us to bow down just at the moment we were commanded
to "eyes right," to jump backwards at the command of "right
dress." Our captain, who seldom lost the equilibrium of his mind, became a
little excited on the occasion, but the line was finally formed. It was the
first time any of us had ever heard the peculiar music of a bomb shell, and I
believe without exception every man thought he was going to be hit just below
the ear; at least every fellow first bowed his head and then came down on his
knee. Solemn as the affair was likely to be, I know that several of us could not
keep from laughing at the sudden and uniform movement of everyone as a shell
passed over our heads.”
(9) “The shells of the enemy being thrown
promiscuously throughout the woods played havoc with the branches of trees,
frequently cutting them off over our heads. Once whilst we were posted in the
road some distance back, Lieutenant Gautreau remarked that whilst we were doing
nothing, he might as well stand behind a tree which was close by, and he
accordingly took that position, but no sooner had he posted himself than a shot
cut off a limb which came tumbling down at his feet and caused him to so
completely change his mind that he was satisfied the open road was the safest
place.” Note: The “open road” was probably the one that paralleled the
river and not the Corinth Road.
(10)
A plaque in the National Cemetery at Shiloh
states that the Union forces reached a point some 200 yards inland from the
“fortified” house “near to where
the cemetery lodge now stands” (see map). While the Yankees may well have been
heading toward this second house, the claim that they reached it is contradicted
by Grisamore’s eyewitness testimony that they retreated from the crest of the
bluff.
(11)
New Orleans Daily Picayune March 11, 1862.
(12)
The fury of the March 1st engagement is
suggested by the rate of fire when contrasted with the much larger April battle.
In March the Lexington fired 202
rounds over the space of three hours (a rate of one round every 53 seconds). In
April, over the course of two and one quarter hours of firing (spread
intermittently over an entire day), the Tyler loosed 200 rounds (a rate of one round every 40 seconds). For
the numbers engaged, the March encounter was a very sharp little incident.
(13)
Whose activities are otherwise unreported during
the battle.
(14)
Ruggles commanded the First Corps of the 2nd
Grand Division of the Beauregard’s Army of the Mississippi Valley.
(15)
New Orleans Daily Picayune, March 9 and 11,
1862.
(16)
The source of Gwin’s information is unclear.
While his official report makes it sound like he himself visited the Confederate
camp, any such visit by Union personnel would have been impossible in light of
his statement that the party under flag of truce was stopped by enemy pickets one mile from the river (OR-Navies). Given that Mouton moved his
camp three miles inland on the evening of March 1, the truce party
could not have seen that new camp. Either the wounded were left in a makeshift
hospital near the landing or Gwin’s information is second hand, possibly from
a deserter or a local citizen. He does not cite his source, but claims, “There
is no doubt of the correctness of the above” – which sounds as though he is
vouching for received intelligence. The plaque in the National Cemetery also
claims that the truce party was allowed to visit the new camp, but, again, this
is at odds with the placement of the Confederate picket line; other information
on the same plaque is faulty, (i.e., the claim that the gunboats “proceeded up
the river to Florence” when Grisamore specifically says they went downstream
after the battle; also, Gwin’s official report was penned that evening at
Savannah, Tennessee – nine miles downstream),
so this statement may be suspect as well.
(17)
Original title:
Reminiscences of Uncle Silas: A
History of the Eighteenth Louisiana Infantry Regiment.
Sources
This research was prompted by relevant excerpts from the Navy Official Records provided me by Ranger Joe Davis of Shiloh National Military Park, and made possible by fellow researcher Joseph Richard, who generously provided the sources of the Confederate diary entries quoted here. Mr. Richards has posted the roster of the 18th Louisiana on his site (referenced below), as well as numerous records of that unit during the war.
The complete contents of the relevant entries in the Navy Official Records are on a separate page, as is the complete text from Bergeron's and Daniel's books.
1913 Report of the Shiloh National Military Park Commission, at http://www.shilohnmp.org/commission/Pages/introduction/battle.htm.
A Revelation of War:
Civilians in Hardin County, Tennessee, Spring, 1862,Vicki Betts,
at http://www.hardinhistory.com/history/vbetts.htm
Encyclopedia of
Cajun Culture at http://www.cajunculture.com/People/MoutonAlf.htm.
Official Records, Series I, Volume 7, p.435, Report of Brigadier-General George W. Cullum
Navy Official Records, Series I, Volume 22, pp. 642-648, Reports of Flag-Officer Andrew Foote, Lieutenants William Gwin and James Shirk, and Assistant Surgeon Thomas Kearney.
Shiloh National Park, information on the March 1 battle recorded on a plaque in the National Cemetery.
Shiloh National Park, personal conversations with park rangers.
Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War, by Larry J. Daniel, Touchstone Books, New York, 1998, pp. 68-70.
Ships vs. Shore, Dave Page, Rutledge Hill Press, 1994.
The 18th Louisiana
Infantry Regiment: A Brief History and Roster, at http://members.tripod.com/j_richard/
courtesy of Joseph L. Richard
The Civil War Reminiscences of Major Silas T. Grisamore, C.S.A., by Arthur W. Bergeron, Jr., Louisiana State Univ. Press, Baton Rouge, 1993, pp. 19-22. (17)
Warships of the Civil War Navies, Paul H. Silverstone, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1989.
