U.S. Naval Submarine Operations during the American Civil War By
This agreement, made and entered into this first day of November, A.D. one
thousand eight hundred and sixty one, between Martin Thomas of one part and
the United States by Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy on the other part,
witnesseth:
First: The party of the first part
will construct and deliver to the party of the second part within forty (40)
days from the date of this agreement, an Iron Submarine Propeller of the plan
of M. de Villeroi, at least fifty six inches (56") in width and sixty six
(66") inches in height and forty five feet in length, for the sum of
fourteen thousand dollars to be paid when completed and delivered, ready for
use within ten days after delivery and certificate is in all respects ready
for service.
Second: The government of the
United States will employ M. de Villeroi to superintend the construction of
said propeller, as well as in its employment for actual service when required,
and agrees to pay him for his full services at the rate of two thousand
dollars per annum whilst thus employed, his pay to commence with the date of
this agreement: also to pay reasonable wages to the crew of said propeller,
and to transport it from Philadelphia to the place or places where the
Secretary of the Navy direct it to be used.
Third: In case the said de
Villeroi shall perform valuable services with said propeller for the United
States by the destruction of an enemy's ship or vessel by direction of the
Secretary of the Navy and to his satisfaction, then the government of the
United States shall pay to the party of the first part a further sum of eighty
six thousand dollars ($86,000) subject to and appropriated by Congress.
Fourth: The secret of said
invention shall be divulged by the inventor, M. de Villeroi, under his solemn
oath or affirmation in a written paper subscribed by him to be sealed and
deposited with the Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks, with the certificate
thereon of Mr. W.L. Hirst that he has carefully examined the paper and firmly
believes it to be of the secret of said invention, not to be opened until
after the payment of said eighty six thousand dollars, or the death,
disability or dereliction of duty of the inventor shall occur.
Fifth: The said invention
shall not be used by or the secret divulged to any government, power or
individual without the consent in writing of both parties to this agreement.
In the presence of S. Gough
/s/ Martin Thomas
/s/ Gideon Welles
Thus begins the strange story which is the genesis of the US Naval Submarine
Force. The War Between the States had been long in coming and was well
underway when in May, 1861, the Philadelphia police, acting on nervous reports
of strange goings on at the waterfront arrested the French diver and inventor
Brutus de Villeroi and some of his workmen. They also impounded a curious
device. It was a tube of iron some thirty three feet long and about five feet
in diameter. De Villeroi had tested the device in the Delaware River and was
going to use for a mobile diver lockout chamber and salvage platform. Needless
to say, the police, not being sure of the patriotic intent of the inventor,
had no idea what this tube was but they knew it needed to put under Naval
control. Captain Samuel F. DuPont, commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard,
was informed and appointed three officers to examine the device, interview the
inventor and report their finding to him and the Navy Department.
The three officers chosen by DuPont, were nearly ideal in qualification to
perform the inspection and review. The senior officer was Commander Henry K.
Hoff of the shipyard staff and an expert in ship design. Commander Charles
Steedman was the second officer and was an expert in naval warfare. An eminent
naval engineer, Robert Danby was the third officer and carried the rank of
Engineer. The three performed the assigned task and reported on the 7th of
July.
They reported that de Villeroi's submarine was already operational and seemed
to be a successful venture. It was screw propelled, resembled a whale in
external form. The report stated there were four major principles
demonstrated. They were, the ability to remain submerged for a length of time
without exposing anything to the outside air, the ability to sink and be
raised at will, the ability of a man to leave and return to the vessel while
both remained submerged and lastly, the ability of a man to survive outside
the submarine while submerged by breathing through an air tube connected to
the inside of the boat. This report, called the Hoff Report filtered up
through the Navy bureaus until it had help from above. De Villeroi had written
the Secretary of the Navy and President Lincoln. The letter to Lincoln was
forwarded to the Navy Department. Secretary Welles called for Commodore Joseph
Smith, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and requested a report on this
submarine. Smith reported that the Hoff report reflected favorable but the
present submarine was too small to readily test the device as a weapon. He
recommended a larger version be built on a "no payment for failure"
basis. A contract was drawn up. Mr. Martin Thomas acting in behalf of M. de
Villeroi (most likely because of citizenship concerns), agreed to build a
larger submarine and deliver it to the Navy.
On the 7th of December, de Villeroi wrote to Commodore Smith that the vessel
was " almost entirely finished". He intimated that there may be some
problems and the build time may need to be extended because of some
"delicate pieces of the interior" were not finished. He said the
ship was entirely different than anything that the yard (Nefie and Levy;s
shipyard which became the Cramp Shipyard) and that it was scarcely possible
for the contractor to appreciate how long it took to build the boat. Thus the
contractor (Thomas) had not scheduled things properly. The seeds of
disagreement had been laid and would disrupt the building.
Enter Mr. William L. Hirst. A Philadelphia lawyer, Hirst acted as a go between
in the dispute between de Villeroi and Thomas. Commodore Smith granted a
fifteen day extension on 10 December 1861, the date the boat was to be
finished. On the 20th, Smith received word that the "secrets" were
in Hirst's possession and locked in his safe. Commodore Smith took a hard
stand on finishing the ship, partly because he was working against a deadline
of his own. Norfolk had fallen and word of the conversion of the USS Merrimac
into the CSS Virginia had reached Washington. Smith told de Villeroi that any
contract scheduling difficulties were "no fault of mine" His letter
passed one from Hirst to the Bureau asking for another 14 days to finish the
work. The inventor wrote at the same time and told Smith that the delays were
entirely the fault of the contractor (Thomas) in that money was not
forthcoming to allow work at night and on weekends. De Villeroi further stated
that more crew had to be hired soon so they could be trained. At the end of
the end of the letter, de Villeroi informed Commodore Smith that the two of
them must correspond directly and not through the contractor to resolve these
problems.
Commodore Smith was furious. He wrote de Villeroi a letter on 3 January 1862
that spelled out the facts of bureaucratic life. He said he would be happy to
correspond but "as for the contract, the Department knows no one but the
contractor". He also informed the inventor that because of the delays and
evident problems, the ship would not be considered received until it had been
well and fully tested and was considered by the Navy to be in all respects.
The second extension passed and the boat was still not finished. It appears
that there were some things the inventor wanted for the boat that Thomas had
not provided and these were needed to produce the "secrets" alluded
to in the contract. From the existing records, it appears that the secrets
were a form of air purification system and a type of battery. The air
purification system would be of great use in allowing the submarine to stay
submerged. The usefulness of the battery is somewhat a mystery. One conjecture
is that is would be used to detonate mines or charges laid by the divers.
De Villeroi wrote to Smith on the 18th of January saying rather magnanimously
that his payment "is in the glory and successful completion of the
work". He went on to say that "after taking on the ballast of lead
and some pieces of platina which have not been furnished me" the work
would be finished. He felt that because the completion date and the extensions
had passed, that the contractor could be done away with and de Villeroi and
Smith could deal directly with each other. He said "Now that you have
done away with the contractor...business ought to be between the government
and the inventor." He then (in the last part of the letter) gave brief
update of the status of the project.
Smith replied on the 22nd of January and burst the inventor's bubble. He
stated that no further money would be forthcoming until the boat was finished
and tested. He continued on to state that the government still knew no one but
the contractor with respect to the boat. One week later he wrote Thomas and
laid it on the line. If the boat was not finished and ready to be shipped
aboard the USS Rhode Island in three or four days, the time for using the
submarine would have passed. He stated "the Merrimac is out of dock and
ready for trial at Norfolk".
The submarine was reported ready for launch on the 29th of January but
according to Thomas, some of the oars that were to be used for propulsion had
to be reworked thus the launch was delayed. A parallel letter from de Villeroi
stated the delay was due to ice on the river. In the meantime, the boat would
be painted, dark green outside and white inside.
February arrived and the boat was still not complete. Commodore Smith was
getting discouraged with the progress of the project and was becoming more and
more concerned with the threat posed by the CSS Virginia. A letter to de
Villeroi on the first showed Smith had little faith in the usefulness of the
boat, but he did feel it warranted a trial. Smith made a tactical error in the
letter. De Villeroi had been asking Thomas for things to finish the boat. He
needed the plates of platina (which were silver covered platinum), explosives
and other items. In his letter of the first of February, Smith told de
Villeroi that the contractor (Thomas) was to furnish everything de Villeroi
needed to finish the submarine. De Villeroi immediately wrote back that there
was a list of things which were required but had not been supplied and were
holding up completion of the boat. These included explosives, two hydraulic
jacks, platina, a telescope which could give distances (an invention of de
Villeroi's which had not been patented or proven to work) and a chest of
tools. In that letter, he complained of an entire litany of thing that Thomas
had done or not done. These included having what de Villeroi termed
"unethical" discussions about his inventions with scientists, not
spending enough money to complete the work in a timely manner. The cost of the
project, he said, was very much less than the $14,000 allowed for by the
contract. He felt that the boat should be taken by the Navy for completion to
keep it safe from harm as he intimated there had been threats against the
boat.
Before this letter had reached the Bureau, Smith informed Thomas that the
terms of the contract had not been met and the boat would not be received by
the Department until "such time as further opportunities avail
themselves" at which time the contract would have to be re negotiated. De
Villeroi, upon hearing of this development, rushed a letter to Smith saying
that he (de Villeroi) was still employed by the government and entitled to pay
until such a time as the Navy Department suspended his nomination as engineer
of the work.
Smith shot back that the relationship between Thomas, de Villeroi and the Navy
Department was "unique" . Smith wrote that "the time has
elapsed for the completion of the boat and the contract is forfeited. You now
decline, as I learn, to give certificate of the completion of the boat because
the contractor demurs to furnishing a quantity of costly material which the
chemists say is unnecessary." The he lowered the boom. "Therefore
work and superintending is stopped and will remain so until you and Mr. Thomas
come to terms....If the contractor will deliver the boat in 10 days complete
and with your certificate and you and your crew will be there, the government
will test the efficiency and if she proves satisfactory, payment will be
made." ... "Until there is compliance with these terms, the
Department will...consider the bargain as closed.
Hirst initiated a flurry of correspondence between Thomas and de Villeroi.
They came to terms on everything but the platina for the battery. The problem
was not whether they were necessary, but what size they were to be. Then, to
complicate matters, de Villeroi went into seclusion. Thomas tried to placate
de Villeroi by sending him money to get the plates that Thomas could not find.
De Villeroi wrote a letter to Smith saying that he considered the money
insulting and an "insidious proposition". He then wrote Lincoln
still trying to cling to a fast vanishing hope that he could receive the
honors for the boat. He said "(I) haven't received a commission as yet as
commander of the Propeller - I would be happy to receive it from you" He
received no recorded reply.
Thomas reported to Smith that attempts to resolve the problems had been
unsuccessful. Smith replied that he regretted the matter had become so
complicated by the terms of the contract had not been met thus the contract
was forfeit. Hirst asked if there weren't some way to salvage the project.
Smith sent Captain Davis of his staff to discuss the problems with the parties
and attempt to resolve the impasse. De Villeroi would not meet with Davis.
Finally on the 18th of April, Commodore Joseph Smith received word that the
first submarine the United States Navy would ever own was ready. There was
still the problem of de Villeroi. Smith directed that de Villeroi resume his
duties per the contract and if he declined to do so the sealed secrets would
be used as de Villeroi would be found derelict in his duty.
On the first of May 1862, the Submarine Propeller was launched by a crane
which lowered the boat into the water of the Delaware River. Mr. Levy stood on
the deck as if to show his confidence. Later that day, she was towed to the
Navy Yard. The submarine had actually been the property of the Navy since the
28th of April when the Navy Department made payment to the shipbuilder. De
Villeroi evidently read of the acquisition of the boat and went ballistic. He
wrote a scathing letter to Secretary Welles and after having received no
reply, he sent another to Smith blasting the honor of everyone who had
anything to do with the project. Smith replied, explaining the facts but to no
avail.
Mr. Samuel Eakin was appointed so superintend the boat and finish the details.
Finally the big day came, Hirst got word from Commodore Smith to formally turn
the boat over to the Commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, a task he
completed on the 13th of June 1862. (Exactly 100 years to the day before the
author's first full day in the Navy). Eakin would be master of the vessel and
the crew would be paid by the Navy.
So what did this submarine look like. We don't know for sure. The available
evidence consists of two drawings of de Villeroi submarines in a French
submarine history book, written descriptions, the specifications, and little
else. Without going into the details of the assumptions and suppositions, the
evidence shows the following description to be fairly close.
Length: 47' (Hull); Beam: 4'-6" (Hull); Extreme Beam: 8'-2" (over
oar guards);
Keel to top of hull: 6'-0"; Keel to top of air tube: 8'-2";
Color: Dark green with white interior; Displacement 275 tons surface/ 350 tons
submerged.
Propulsion: As built; 16 oars, (8 on each side). After November 1862; screw
propeller.
Crew: One officer, one helmsman, one or two divers, and 8 oarsmen.
Weapons: Planned. 4 pounder cannon, auger and limpet mine, cable cutters,
Installed: Divers and explosives, torpedos (mines)
It was riveted iron plates, rounded top and bottom and tapered at the ends.
The access to the interior was via a hatch set forward on the upper side of
the hull. Another hatch on the lower side of the tapered bow structure for
diver access. There was a small diver lockout chamber in the bow. A cast dome
shaped conning tower was set at the forward end of the parallel mid body and
just forward of the access hatch. This conning tower had four glass windows,
one on each side, one forward and one aft. There were 8 oarsmen in the crew,
one helmsman and an officer for a total of 12. It is assumed that one or more
of the divers took their place at the oars.
As a side note, on the page following the contract for the Submarine Propeller
in the Bureau of Yards and Docks contract book, was the following document:
This agreement, in two parts entered into this first day of November A.D. 1861 between Henry Lambert, John Lambert, Rode Alexander, and John France of the first part, and Joseph Smith, Chief of the bureau of Yards and Docks, acting under the Navy Department, of the second part, witnesseth:-The party of the first part agree to serve the United States as operatives in the submarine propeller under contract with Martin Thomas for and during such a time as they shall be employed, by the United States, at the rate of twenty four dollars per month each, for their full services and sixteen dollars per month for their full subsistence and necessary clothing for the work; and they further agree to sign the oath of allegiance to the United States as prescribed and submit to the laws of the United States enacted for the government of the Navy of the United States.
And the party of the second part agrees to pay them the wages monthly, with
ten dollars bounty each on signing this agreement, as bounty for engaging in
perilous services of this propeller, under orders of the officers of the
government placed over them.
Signed Sealed and Delivered
in the presence of
Geo. Patchel Henri Lambert
Martin Thomas John Lambert
Alexander Rhodes
John Franc
By the time the submarine was ready, the CSS Virginia was gone,
scuttled by her crew and the next big task was helping the Union Army now
stuck on a line from Harrison Landing northward around the east side of
Richmond. There were obstructions in the James River near Drewry's Bluff
which, if cleared would supposedly allow ironclad ships like USS Galena
and USS Monitor to pass upriver and flank the Confederate line and
bombard Richmond. The submarine was towed to Hampton Roads under tow of the
tug Fred Copp. Commodore Smith had ordered the boat to the command of
Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.
By the time the ship had arrived at Hampton Roads it had acquired the name
Alligator, most likely because of the long green shape and the movements of
its oars. Goldsborough ordered the ship to moor alongside the ship Satellite
which he ordered to provide berthing and messing of the subs crew and whatever
else the ship and its crew needed. He therefore created a new concept, the
forward area based submarine tender. Goldsborough turned over tactical command
of the sub to Lt. (Commanding) John Rogers of the USS Galena. He inspected the
sub on the 25th of June at City Point, Virginia. After a tour and discussion
with Eakin he rejected using the boat for the task of breaching the
obstructions and rejected the alternative task of blowing up the railroad
bridge at Petersburg. His logic, even today, is irrefutable. The submarine
required at least 6 feet of water to operate submerged and another 18"
minimum to lock out a diver. Both the James and the Appomattox were less than
7' at the points of operation. The ship would have to operate semi submerged
and would be vulnerable to cannon fire. He insisted the boat be sent back to
Hampton Roads to prevent capture and use by the Confederates. There were no
targets for the ship in the hands of the Union Navy, but in Confederate hands,
havoc could have ensued. On the 29th the boat was on its way back to the Roads
and then to Washington for further testing. It had spent a full eight days in
the "combat zone" and had not been used.
Alongside a pier at the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC the boat waited
until late July for the arrival of Lt. Thomas O. Selfridge. Welles offered him
command of the Alligator and directed that he commence a training and
testing program with the submarine. He took the boat out several times over
the next week and issued a report on the 8th of August 1862. He was not
optimistic as he had trouble controlling it while running submerged and could
not get respectable speed surfaced or submerged. The report was forwarded to
the department and on the bottom had a note, possibly in the handwriting of
Commodore Smith, "the enterprise is a failure."
During the winter of 1862, the boat, which had won some converts, underwent a
propulsion change. Its oars were removed and a screw propeller added. In a
test witnessed by President Lincoln on the 18th of March, 1863, the boat made
four knots. A letter to Commodore Smith stated the boat operated admirably.
Now, in the spring of 1863, there was another task. The commander of the South
Atlantic Blockading Squadron was not Samuel F. DuPont, the same officer that
had headed the initial investigation of de Villeroi's invention eighteen
months before. He was now in Port Royal near Charleston and had a big problem.
DuPont had the hard nut of Charleston harbor to crack and unlike Farrigut he
couldn't just force passage by running past the forts into the inner harbor.
Even there, his ships would have been sitting ducks. In addition, the CSS Chicora
and CSS Palmetto State, two ironclads threatened to lift the blockade
by escorting cargo ships past the Union Naval forces off the harbor entrance.
The Alligator would be ideal for attacking these two ships at their
anchorage. He requested the services of the submarine and was rewarded by
orders that the submarine would be towed to Port Royal for his use.
Sumpter picks up the tow. Watercolor by Jim Christley
On 31 March 1863, the ship was underway in the tow of the USS Sumpter
under the command of Acting Master J.F. Winchester. The weather in the
Atlantic was stormy and on 2 April the port tow line parted.
The efforts of the crew of the Sumpter to gain control of the tow were not successful. The little sub began to yaw wildly and the Sumpter could not control it. The Sumpter could not maintain enough way on to prevent being broached and possibly sunk. Winchester with the agreement of Acting Master Eakin (who had command of the Alligator again) elected to cut the little submarine loose. If the submarine lasted afloat until the seas abated they would take it in tow again. No crew were aboard so there was no danger to life, only to the boat. So as the stormy skies darkened with the oncoming night, the little submarine was cast loose to fend for itself some 50 miles south of Cape Hatteras. It was never seen again.
At six Alligator was cut loose. Watercolor by Jim Christley
The H.L.Hunley, a Confederate Submarine, was launched at the Theater
Street Dock in Mobile, Alabama in mid-July 1863. The Hunley was just a
bit over half as long as the Alligator but in other respects was nearly
the same. Forty eight inches in the beam and six feet high, the boat was
propelled by eight men on a crank shaft attached to a screw propeller. There
are two possibilities for the similarity. First is, like many engineering
projects, two different people might well arrive at the same general design
features without any contact between them. The other is that the details of
the Union Submarine Propeller were used to guide development of the
Confederate submarine. It is my view that the development of the Hunley
and Alligator were parallel developments with only the possibility that
the design of one contributed to the design of the other. No documentary
evidence has come to light as yet that either of the inventors/builders even
knew of the other design's details. The H.L. Hunley became the first
submarine to sink a warship in combat. The Alligator was the first
American submarine to be owned and operated by the US Navy and was first to be
assigned to a combat area. It is a unique testament to the American spirit and
talent for technological innovation that the first two submarines used in
wartime should look and operate so much alike.
Artist rendition of Alligator as she may look today.
Pen and ink by Jim Christley
Jim Christley has a variety of information about other U.S. submarines on his Old Subs site at http://home.att.net/~jimchris/.