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The
Assault on Fort Fisher
January 15, 1865

From the Official Records of the Navies

[Note: In these nineteenth century style communications, the addressee appears below the closing salutation and name of the sender.]

Telegram from Porter announcing victory
Report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U. S. Navy
Report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U. S. Navy, regarding the capture of all the works on Federal Point
Detailed report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U.S. Navy, transmitting lists of casualties
Special report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U. S. Navy, in commendation of Major-General Terry, U. S. Army
Special report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U. S. Navy, commendatory of the conduct of Second Lt Clemens, U. S. Signal Corps
Report of Lieutenant-Commander Breese, U.S. Navy, regarding the assault
Report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U.S. Navy, regarding the deaths of Lieutenants Preston and Porter, U. S. Navy
Unofficial letter from Lieutenant Lamson, U.S. Navy, to Commander Rhind, U. S. Navy, regarding the death of Lieutenant Preston
Report of Lieutenant-Commander Breese, U.S. Navy, calling attention to special acts of gallantry
Report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U. S. Navy, in commendation of officers of his command


[Telegram.]

OFF FORT FISHER, January 15, 1865.
(Received 11:30 a.m., January 17.)

SIR: Fort Fisher is ours. I send a bearer of dispatches with a brief account of the affair. General Terry is entitled to the highest praise and the gratitude of his country for the manner in which he has conducted his part of the operations. He is my beau ideal of a soldier and a general. Our cooperation has been most cordial. The result is victory, which will always be ours when the Army and Navy go hand in hand. The Navy loss in the assault was heavy. The Army loss is also heavy.

D. D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral.

HON. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

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Report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U. S. Navy.

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,
U.S. Flagship Malvern, off Fort Fisher, January 15, 1865.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that we have possession of Fort Fisher, and the fall of the surrounding works will soon follow. As I informed you in my last we had commenced operations with the iron vessels, which bombarded while we landed the troops. On the 14th I ordered all the vessels carrying XI-inch guns to bombard, with the Ironsides, the Brooklyn taking the lead; by sunset the fort was reduced to a pulp; every gun was silenced by being injured or covered up with earth so that they would not work.

On the 15th General Terry and myself arranged for an assault, and I ordered 1,400 sailors and marines to participate. At daylight the iron vessels, Brooklyn, and XI-inch gunboats commenced battering the work, while the troops made a lodgment within 150 yards of the fort. At 10 o'clock all the vessels steamed in and took their stations, opening a heavy fire, which was kept up until 3 p.m., when the signal was made to assault, the soldiers taking the land side and the sailors the sea face, the ships changing (but not stopping) their fire to other works. The rebels met us with a courage worthy of a better cause and fought desperately. About 30 of the sailors and officers succeeded in getting to the top of the parapet amidst a murderous fire of grape, canister, and musketry; they had planted the flag there, but were swept away in a moment. Others tried to get up the steep "pan coupee." The marines could have cleared the parapets by keeping up a steady fire, but they failed to do so and the sailors were repulsed.

Many gallant fellows fell trying to emulate their brothers in arms who were fighting to obtain an entrance on the northeast angle as it appears on our charts.

The enemy mistook the Seamen's attack for the main body of troops and opposed a most vigorous resistance there, but I witnessed it all and think the marines could have made the assault successful. In the meantime our gallant soldiers had gained a foothold on the northeast [northwest] corner of the fort, fighting like lions, and contesting every inch of ground. The Ironsides and monitors kept throwing their shells into the traverses not occupied by our men but occupied by the rebels.

In this way our troops fought from traverse to traverse from 3 o'clock in the afternoon until 10 at night. When the joyful tidings were signaled to the fleet we stopped our fire and gave them three of the heartiest cheers I ever heard.

It has been the most terrific struggle I ever saw, and very much hard labor. The troops have covered themselves with glory, and General Terry is my beau ideal of a soldier and a general.

Our cooperation has been most harmonious, and I think the general will do the Navy the credit to say that this time, at least, we "substantially injured the fort as a defensive work."

General Terry had only a few more troops than we had on the last occasion when the enemy had only 150 men in the works. This time the works were fully manned and contained about 800 men at the time of the assault.

It is a matter of great regret to me to see my gallant officers and men so cut up, but I was unwilling to let the troops undertake the capture of the works without the Navy's sharing with them the peril all were anxious to undergo, and we should have had the honor of meeting our brothers in arms in the works had the sailors been properly supported. We have lost about 200 in killed and wounded, and amongst them some gallant officers.

I regret to announce the death of Lieutenant S. W. Preston and Lieutenant B. H. Porter. They were captured together in the attack on Fort Sumter and died together in endeavoring to pull down the flag that has so long flaunted in our faces.

Lieutenant R. H. Lamson was severely wounded. He was lately associated with Lieutenant Preston in his perilous adventure of the powder boat.

Lieutenant George M. Bache and a number of others were wounded; the former not dangerously.

The assault only took place a few hours ago, and I am unable to inform you of our casualties. They are quite severe from the assault, but we had no casualties from the enemy's cannon.

Knowing the impatience of the Department to receive news from Fort Fisher, I have written these few hurried lines.

No one can conceive what the Army and Navy have gone through to achieve this victory--which should have been ours on Christmas Day without the loss of a dozen men.

This has been a day of terrific struggle, and not surpassed by any events of the war.

We are all worn out nearly, and you must excuse this brief and unsatisfactory account. I will write fully by the Santiago de Cuba, which goes north to-morrow to carry the wounded.

Besides the men in Fort Fisher there were about 500 in the upper forts, and a relief of about 1,500 men brought down by steamers this morning. So far, I believe we have only captured the garrison of Fort Fisher.

I don't suppose there ever was a work subjected to such a terrific bombardment or where the appearance of a fort was more altered.

There is not a spot of earth about the fort that has not been torn up by our shells. I don't know yet the number of killed and wounded by our fire, but one XV-inch shell alone pierced a bombproof, killing 16 and wounding severely 25.

I presume we are in possession of all the forts, as Fort Fisher commands them all. It is so late now that I can learn nothing more until morning.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C.

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Report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U. S. Navy, regarding the capture of all the works on Federal Point.

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,
U. S. Flagship Malvern, off Fort Fisher, January 16, 1865.

SIR: I wrote you yesterday. We have all the forts. The army has captured 1,800 men and a large number of officers, including General Whiting and Colonel Lamb.

The gunboats are now in the river and Wilmington is hermetically scaled against blockade runners. The rebels have destroyed the works on Smith's Island, and if they don't destroy Fort Gaswell it is no use to them; we will get that after a little while. You must not expect too much of us at one time--these works are tremendous. I was in Fort Malakoff a few days after it surrendered to the French and English; the combined armies of the two nations were many months capturing that stronghold, and it won't compare either in size or strength to Fort Fisher. The fort contains 75 guns, and many of them heavy ones.

I have not yet learned what our casualties are in killed and wounded, but I think 300 will cover them all.

We had a bad explosion in the fort this morning which killed and wounded a number of men, about 100. Some of our seamen were blown up, and Acting Assistant Paymaster R. H. Gillette, of the Gettysburg, was killed. I don't know how many of the troops were killed.

I will send a detailed report as soon as I can get off the wounded and arrange matters generally.

The world never saw such fighting as our soldiers did.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral.

HON. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

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Detailed report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U.S. Navy, transmitting lists of casualties.

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,
U. S. Flagship Malvern, off Fort Fisher, January 17, 1865.

SIR: I had the honor to make you a short report on the 15th, stating to you that Fort Fisher had been captured by the military and naval forces now here. I beg leave to submit now a detailed report of the operations, having received all, or nearly all, the information required to make out a complete report.

As soon as Major-General Terry arrived at Beaufort, N. C., which he did on the 8th December [January], we arranged together a plan of operations which has proved successful.

The weather was threatening, and I advised the general to get his transports inside the harbor to avoid the violence of the coming gale; most of them, however, laid outside.

The gale blew very heavy for two days and nights. The ships of war all held on and rode out at their anchors, except the Colorado, which vessel was obliged to go to sea, having only one anchor left, with which alone she could not possibly have ridden out the gale, the sea being very heavy from the S. W. and breaking clear over the vessels. Knowing that the transports had arrived, the commanders all made strenuous efforts to keep their vessels at anchor off Beaufort, to be ready for the move that was about to be made.

Having expended almost every shot and shell in the first bombardment, it became necessary to take in about 15,000 more and fill up with coal, which was done under the most adverse circumstances, the large vessels all lying outside in a heavy sea, and filling up as best they could. The fleet, accompanied by the transports, steamed away on the 12th for Fort Fisher, and the wind being fair and moderate I was in hopes that we would he able to land the troops by 9 or 10 o'clock that night. The wind changing to S. W., we were obliged to anchor off Half Moon battery for the night.

The fleet sailed in three columns. Line No. 1, led by the Brooklyn, Captain James Alden, consisted of the Mohican, Commander Daniel Aremen; Tacony, Lieutenant-Commander W. T. Truxtun; Kansas, Lieutenant-Commander P. G. Watmough; Yantic, Lieutenant-Commander T. C. Harris; Unadilla, Lieutenant. Commander F. M. Ramsay; Huron, Lieutenant-Commander T. O. Selfridge; Maumee, Lieutenant-Commander Ralph Chandler; Pequot, Lieutenant-Commander D. L. Braine; Pawtuxet, Commander J. H. Spotts; Seneca, Lieutenant. Commander M. Sicard; Pontoosuc, Lieutenant-Commander W. G. Temple; Nereus, Commander J. C. Howell.

Line No. 2, Minnesota, Commodore Joseph Lanman, leading, consisted of the Colorado, Commodore H. K. Thatcher; Wabash, Captain M. Smith; Susquehanna, Commodore S. W. Godon; Powhatan, Commodore J. F. Schenck; Juniata, Lieutenant-Commander T. S. Phelps; Shenandoah, Captain D. B. Ridgley; Ticonderoga, Captain Charles Steedman; Vanderbilt, Captain C. W. Pickering; Mackinaw, Commander J. C. Beaumont; Tuscarora, Commander J. M. Frailey.

Line No. 3, Santiago de Cuba, Captain O. S. Glisson, leading, consisted of the Fort Jackson, Captain B. F. Sands; Osceola, Commander J. M. B. Clitz; Sassacus, Lieutenant. Commander J. L. Davis; Chippewa, Lieu-tenant-Commander E. E. Potter; R. R. Cuyler, Commander C. H. B. Caldwell; Maratanza, Lieutenant-Commander George W. Young; Rhode Island, Commander S. D. Trenchard; Monticello, Lieutenant W. B. Cushing; Alabama, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant A. R. Langthorne; Montgomery, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant T. C. Dunn; Iosco, Commander John Guest.

The reserve division, under Lieutenant-Commander J. H. Upshur, in the A. D. Vance, consisted of the Britannia, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant W. B. Sheldon; Tristram Shandy, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant F. M. Green; Liltart, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant T. A. Harris; Fort Donelson, Acting Master G. W. Frost; Wilderness, Acting Master H. Arey; Aries, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant F. S. Wells; Gov. Buckingham, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant J. MacDiarmid; the Nansemond (Acting Master J. H. Porter), Little Ada (Acting Master S. P. Crafts), Eolus (Acting Master E. S. Keyser), and Republic (Acting Ensign J. W. Bennett) being used as dispatch vessels.

Great enthusiasm was displayed in the fleet when it was ascertained that troops had come to renew the attack on Fort Fisher, for great was the disappointment on account of the late failure.

Some of the vessels that accompanied the last expedition were badly damaged in various ways. The Sassacus had both rudders disabled, but her energetic commander, Lieutenant. Commander J. L. Davis, was ready in time. The Mackinaw, Commander J. C. Beaumont, had one of her boilers knocked to pieces, but her commander would go on one boiler.

The Osceola, Commander J. M. B. Clitz, in the same condition, one boiler smashed up with shot and a hole near the bottom, was ready for anything, and I heard no complaints from anyone. With such a disposition on the part of the officers, I anticipated the most favorable result.

At daylight on the 13th instant line No. 1 took position within 600 yards of the beach to land the troops, lines No. 2 and 3 anchoring close to and outside of them, and the reserves taking charge of the provision vessels.

At 8:30 a.m. signal was made to the fleet to send boats to transports to land troops. At 2 p.m. we had landed 8,000 men with 12 days' provisions and all their intrenching tools.

In the meantime the New Ironsides, Commodore William Radford; Saugus, Commander E. R. Colhoun: Canonicus, Lieutenant-Commander George E. Belknap; Mahopac, Lieutenant-Commander A. W. Weaver; and Monadnock, Commander E. O. Parrott, were ordered in to take a nearer position, the outside vessel (the Ironsides) being 1,000 yards from Fort Fisher, which was the principal work, and on which the iron vessels were ordered to pour all their fire and endeavor to dismount all the guns. They got into position about 8 a.m. and opened fire deliberately.

The troops having all landed without opposition, at 3 p.m. I signaled line No. 2 to get underway and go in and attack. Line No. 1 was signaled to take position in front of the batteries, and line No. 3 was to remain and cover the landing party and get the field artillery on shore.

The different lines, having formed into line of battle, steamed toward Fort Fisher, the Colorado leading (the Minnesota having got a hawser around her propeller). The vessels took their positions handsomely (having had some practice at that place)and delivered their fire as they fell in. The rapid fire [of the] monitors and Ironsides kept the rebels partly away from their guns, and they inflicted no damage on the fleet, the firing being very unsteady. Indeed, I don't see how they could fire at all after lines Nos. I and 2 got fairly anchored in position; the bombardment was very rapid and severe. This was continued without intermission from 4 p.m. until some time after dark, when the wooden vessels were ordered to haul out and anchor. The monitors and Ironsides were directed to keep up the fire during the night. The enemy had long ceased to respond to our fire and kept in his bombproofs.

I could see that our fire had damaged some of their guns, and I determined before the army went to the assault there should be no guns (within our reach) to arrest their progress.

Having found that the rebels could still bring some heavy guns to bear, which annoyed us somewhat, I determined to try another plan, and on the morning of the 14th ordered in all the small gunboats carrying XI-inch guns to fire slowly and try and dismount the guns on the face of the works where the assault was to be made. The Brooklyn was ordered to throw in a pretty quick fire to keep the rebels from working their guns. The attack was commenced at I p.m. and lasted until long after dark. One or two guns only were fired this day from the upper batteries, inflicting no serious damage on any of the vessels, except cutting away the mainmast of the Huron and hitting the Unadilla once or twice. These guns were always silenced when a rapid fire was opened. The attack of the gunboats lasted until long after dark, and one vessel was employed firing (an hour each) throughout the night. On this evening General Terry came on board to see me and arrange the plan of battle for the next day. The troops had got rested after their long confinement on ship board and sea voyage, and had recovered from the drenching they received when landing through the surf. Having been long enough on their native element, they were eager for the attack.

It was arranged between the General and myself that the ships should all go in early and fire rapidly through the day until the time for the assault came off. The hour named was 2 p.m. I detailed 1,600 sailors and 400 marines to accompany the troops in the assault--the sailors to board the sea face, while the troops assaulted the land side.

Most all of the sailors were armed with cutlasses and revolvers, while a number had Sharps rifles or short carbines. I herewith enclose the order of attack on the fort, and the manner of approaching it. There was a perfect understanding between the general and myself, and a system of signals established (by the Army code) by which we could converse at our pleasure, though nearly a mile apart and amidst the din of battle.

At 9 a.m. on the 15th the squadron was signaled to attack in three lines, or assume position marked on the plan herewith enclosed.

All the vessels reached position at about 11 a.m., and each opened fire as they got their anchors down.

The same guns in the upper batteries opened again this day with some effect, as you will see by reference to the reports of different commanders, but no vessel was injured sufficiently to interfere in the least with her efficiency. The fire was kept up furiously all day. The Mound Hill battery kept up rather a galling fire with its two heavy guns, but the rebels were driven away from their works into their bomb-proofs, so that no vessel was in the least disabled.

At 2 o'clock I expected the signal for the vessels to "change the direction of their fire," so that the troops might assault. The sailors and marines had worked, by digging ditches or rifle pits, to within 200 yards of the fort, and were all ready. The troops, however, did not get into position until later, and at 3 o'clock the signal came. The vessels changed their fire to the upper batteries, all the steam whistles were blown, and the troops and sailors dashed ahead, nobly vying with each other to reach the top of the parapet. We had evidently (we thought) injured all the large guns so that they could not be fired to annoy anyone. The sailors took to the assault by the flank along the beach, while the troops rushed in at the left through the palisades, that had been knocked away by the fire of our guns.

All the arrangements on the part of the sailors had been well carried out; they had succeeded in getting up to within a short distance of the fort and laid securely in their ditches. We had but very few killed and wounded to this point. The marines were to have held the rifle pits and cover the boarding party, which they failed to do. On rushing through the palisades, which extended from the fort to the sea, the head of the column received a murderous fire of grape and canister, which did not, however, check the officers and sailors who were leading; the parapets now swarmed with rebels, who poured in a destructive fire of musketry. At this moment, had the marines performed their duty, every one of the rebels on the parapets would have been killed.

I witnessed the whole affair; saw how recklessly the rebels exposed themselves, and what an advantage they gave our sharpshooters, whose guns were scarcely fired, or fired with no precision. Notwithstanding the hot fire, officers and sailors in the lead rushed on, and some even reached the parapet--a large number having reached the ditch.

The advance was swept from the parapet like chaff, and, notwithstanding all the efforts made by commanders of companies to stop them, the men in the rear, seeing the slaughter in front and that they were not <nor11_440>covered by the marines, commenced to retreat, and, as there is no stopping a sailor if he fails on such an occasion on the first rush, I saw the whole thing had to be given up. In the meantime the troops were more successful on their side. The rebels, seeing so large a body of men coming at them on the sea side, were under the impression it was the main attack, and concentrated the largest part of their forces at that point, and when they gave three rebel cheers, thinking they had gained the day, they received a volley of musketry in their backs from our gallant soldiers who had been successful in gaining the highest parapet. Then commenced such a system of fighting as has never been beaten. Our soldiers had gained two traverses, while I directed the Ironsides to fire on the traverses occupied by the rebels. Four, five, and six traverses were carried by our troops in the space of an hour. These traverses are immense bombproofs, about 60 feet long, 50 feet wide, and 20 feet high--17 of them in all--being on the northeast face. Between each traverse or bombproof are one or two heavy guns. The fighting lasted until 10 o'clock at night, the Ironsides and monitors firing through the traverses in advance of our troops, and the level strip of land called Federal Point being enfiladed by the ships to prevent reinforcements reaching the rebels.

General Terry himself went into the fort, and I kept up constant communication with him, until three hearty cheers, which were taken up by the fleet, announced the capture of Fort Fisher. Finding that the general felt anxious about the enemy receiving reinforcements, I directed the sailors and marines to relieve the troops in the outer line of our defenses, and a large number of soldiers were thus enabled to join our forces in the fort.

It will not be amiss for me to remark here that I never saw anything like the fearless gallantry and endurance displayed by our troops; they fought like lions, and knew no such word as fail. They finally fought and chased the rebels from traverse to traverse until they reached Battery Lamb, or the Mound--a face of work extending about 1,400 yards in length. At this point the rebels broke and fled to the end of Federal Point. Our troops followed them up, and they surrendered at discretion.

Thus ended one of the most remarkable battles on record, and one which will do more damage to the rebel cause than any that has taken place this war. Two thousand three hundred rebels manned Fort Fisher; 1,900 were taken prisoners; the rest were killed or wounded. I may have stated some inaccuracies with regard to these military matters, which I will leave to General Terry to supply.

I have since visited Fort Fisher and the adjoining works, and find their strength greatly beyond what I had conceived; an engineer might be excusable in saying they could not be captured except by regular siege, I wonder even now how it was done.

The work, as I said before, is really stronger than the Malakoff Tower, which defied so long the combined power of France and England, and yet it is captured by a handful of men under the fire of the guns of the fleet, and in seven hours after the attack commenced in earnest.

I can not say too much in praise of the conduct of this fleet during the time we have been engaged in these operations. I do not know an officer in command who has not performed his duty to the best of his ability. There may be some who have done better than others, but, after all, that may be a mere matter of opinion, or a matter of prejudice or partiality; all did their best, and we can ask no more. To make invidious distinctions in a report of this kind would be causing matter <nor11_441>for dispute, and I shall content myself with saying that the Government may well be proud of those whom it has intrusted here with the command of the vessels.

I leave each commander to tell what his subordinates have done, and refer the Department to the reports of divisional commanders for an account of what they saw and did. I will, however, make a special report of what I consider due to those who have been engaged in this contest and have persistently fought for the Union.

I refer you to Lieutenant Commander K. R. Breese, who led the assault. The result was not what I expected when I planned the attack, but it would have succeeded without severe loss had the marines performed their duty. As it is, we have lost heavily, and the country has lost some gallant officers who fell on the enemy's ramparts.

The success is so great that we should not complain. Men, it seems, must die that this Union may live, and the Constitution under which we have gained our prosperity must be maintained. We regret our companions in arms and shed a tear over their remains, but if these rebels should succeed we would have nothing but regret left us and our lives would be spent in terror and sorrow.

As soon as the forts were taken I pushed the lightdraft gunboats into the river; that is, as soon as I could find and buoy out a channel and take up the torpedoes, which were very thick. We found the wires leading to many, and underrun them with boats. We found the torpedoes too heavy to lift with our ordinary boats, and they must have contained at least a ton of powder. The rebels seemed disposed to pay us back for the famous torpedo Louisiana, which exploded in their harbor and did them no harm.

We had some difficulty in getting the vessels across the bar and into the river, as the channel is very narrow and the bar very shoal A few of them got stuck, but were got off again with the tide. We all came to the conclusion that we had followed the right plan to capture Fort Fisher, one in which the nautical man of any sense will concur. After I got three of the gunboats inside the bar and under the Mound, the rebels prepared to evacuate Fort Caswell. Two steamers near the fort (which I think were the Tallahassee and Chickamauga) were set fire to and blown up after the rebels had set fire to the fort. That blew up last night with a heavy explosion, followed by some minor ones. The barracks were apparently in flames all night and some little works between this and Caswell blown up. I have sent vessels to see what has been done, and shall be governed accordingly. I think they are burning up everything in Wilmington, and are getting away as fast as they can. In the meantime a large force of gunboats occupies the river between Caswell and Wilmington. That place is hermetically sealed against blockade runners, and no Alabamas or Floridas, Chickamaugas or Tallahassees will ever fit out again from this port, and our merchant vessels will soon, I hope, be enabled to pursue in safety their avocation.

I send you a list of killed and wounded; we have lost more than I at first estimated.

We expended in the bombardment about 50,000 shells and have as much more on hand.

I feel much indebted to the Bureau of Ordnance for so promptly supplying us with ammunition and guns. I regret that someone stopped our supply of coal (which should have been doubly increased), for it came very near defeating this expedition. Had we not been supplied by the Army, this expedition would have been a failure.

We shall move along carefully, have no vessels blown up with torpedoes if I can help it, and I think we will be in Wilmington before long.

You may rest satisfied, sir, that the gate through which the rebels obtained their supplies is closed forever, and we can sit here quietly and watch the traitors starve.

I enclose you a number of reports (dry, though necessary details) with which I will not overload my report (already too long) on such an interesting occasion.

The number of guns captured in these works amount to 75, many of them superb rifled pieces of very heavy caliber. All those facing the ships were dismounted or injured so they could not be used, or the muzzles were filled up with sand or dirt, which rendered them useless. I only saw two that were not rendered useless.

I believe we have burst all the rifled guns left in the fleet (one on the Susquehanna, one on the Pequot, and one on the Osceola) and I think the reputation of these guns is now about ruined.

I shall take occasion in another dispatch to call your attention to those officers whom I consider worthy of the most praise and the approbation and notice of the Department.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

[Enclosures.]

List of officers killed and wounded during the attack upon Fort Fisher.

KILLED IN THE ASSAULT.

Lieut. S. W. Preston                             Flag-Lieutenant.
Asst. Surg. Wm. Longshaw             U.S.S. Minnesota.
Lieut. B. H. Porter                             Commanding Flagship Malvern.
Act. Ensign Robt. Wiley.                     U.S.S. Montgomery.

KILLED BY EXPLOSION OF MAGAZINE IN FORT FISHER JANUARY 16.

Act. Asst. Paymaster R. H. Gillette.    U. S. S. Gettysburg.
Act. Ensign A. S. Laighton.             U. S. S. Gettysburg

WOUNDED IN THE ASSAULT.

Lieut.-Commander W. N. Allen.    U. S. S. Tuscarora.
Act. Ensign F. A. O'Connor.             U. S. S. Minnesota.
Act. Ensign G. W. Coffin                     U. S. S. Gettysburg.
Lieut. G. M. Bache.                             U. S. S. Powhatan.
Act. Ensign B. Wood.                     U. S. S. Tristam Shandy.
Lieut. R. H. Lamson.                     Commanding U. S. S. Gettysburg.
Act. Master A. J. Louch.                     U. S. S. Mackinaw.
Act. Vol. Lieut. F. F. Baury.             U. S. S. Colorado.
Act. M. Mate E. K. Greene.             Do.
Ensign R. D. Evans.                             U. S. S. Powhatan.
Act. M. Mate J. M. Simms             U. S. S. Minnesota.
Ensign Ira Harris.                             Do.
Act. M. Mate A. F. Aldrich.             U. S. S. Tuscarora.
Act. Ensign L. R. Chester.             U. S. S. Pontoosuc.
Act. Ensign James Birtwistle.             U. S. S. Minnesota.

Total officers killed and wounded    21

Number of killed, wounded, and missing in the attack upon Fort Fisher.

Flagship Malvern:
Killed in the assault                              

3

Wounded in the assault

1

U.S.S. Saugus:
Wounded by bursting of gun

1

U.S.S. Pontoosuc:
Wounded in the assault

7

U.S.S. Kansas:
Wounded in the assault

1

U.S.S. Tacony:
Killed in the assault

2

Wounded in the assault

9

Wounded in action

3

U.S.S. Canonicus:
Wounded in action

3

U.S.S. Colorado:
Killed in the assault

2

Killed in action

1

Wounded in the assault

12

Wounded in action

2

Missing

8

U.S.S. Nereus:
Killed in the assault
Wounded in the assault

3

U.S.S. Pequot:

3

Killed in the assault
Killed by bursting of gun 

1

Wounded in the assault

3

Wounded by bursting of gun

2

U.S.S. Gettysburg:
Killed in the assault

2

Killed by explosion of magazine in Fort Fisher January 16

4

Wounded in the assault

6

U.S.S. Ticonderoga:
Killed in the assault

1

Wounded in the assault

6

U.S.S. Iosco:
Killed in the assault 2
Wounded in the assault 12
U.S.S. Shenandoah:
Wounded in the assault 6
Missing 5
U.S.S. Tuscarora:
Killed in the assault 3
Wounded in the assault 12
U.S.S. Rhode Island:
Wounded in the assault 8
Missing 2
U.S.S. Huron:
Wounded in the assault 5
U.S.S. Montgomery:
Killed in the assault 2
Wounded in the assault 4
U.S.S. Monticello:
Killed in the assault 4
Wounded in the assault 4
U.S.S. Wabash (incomplete):
Wounded in the assault 12
U.S.S. Tristram Shandy:
Wounded in the assault 2
Missing 1
U.S.S. Susquehanna:
Killed in the assault 3
Wounded in the assault 11
Wounded by bursting of gun 4
U.S.S. Juniata:
Killed in the assault 5
Wounded in the assault 10
U.S.S. Santiago de Cuba:
Killed in the assault 1
Wounded in the assault 7
Wounded in action 2
U.S.S. Fort Jackson:
Killed in the assault 1
Wounded in the assault 10
U.S.S. Yantic:
Killed in the assault 2
Wounded in the assault 1
U.S.S. Powhatan:
Killed in the assault 3
Wounded in the assault 19
Missing 8
U.S.S. Minnesota:
Killed in the assault 10
Killed by explosion of magazine in Fort Fisher January 16 3
Wounded in the assault 23
U.S.S. Mackinaw:
Wounded in the assault 2
U.S.S. Mohican:
Wounded in the assault 12
Total killed, wounded, and missing 309

NOTE.--An examination of reports and logs shows the following casualties in United States naval forces engaged in the second attack on and capture of Fort Fisher: Officers: Killed, 6; wounded, 26. Enlisted men: Killed, 82; wounded, 245; missing, 34. Grand total killed, wounded, and missing, 393. This includes of the marines 2 officers wounded; and of the men 7 killed, 47 wounded; and 5 missing. --COMPILERS.

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Special report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U. S. Navy, in commendation of Major-General Terry, U. S. Army.

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,
Flagship Malvern, off Smithville, N. C., January 20, 1865.

SIR: I have been so much pleased with General Terry and the manner in which he has conducted his part of the operations here that 1 deem it worthy of a special dispatch to express what I feel.

General Terry is no doubt well known to his associates in the field who have served with him, and to the lieutenant-general who selected him for this service, but the American people should know and feel the very great service he has rendered them by his most admirable assault on these tremendous works. Young, brave, and unassuming, he bears his success with the modesty of [a] true soldier, and is willing to give credit to those who shared with him the perils of the assault. No one could form the slightest conception of these works--their magnitude, strength, and extent--who had not seen them, and General Whiting (the founder) must have had an abiding faith in the durability of the Confederacy when he expended so many years of labor on them.

The result of the fall of Fort Fisher was the fall of all the surrounding works in and near this place. Fort Caswell, a large work at the west inlet, mounting 29 guns; all the works on Smith's Island, the works between Caswell and Smithville, up to battery on Reeves' Point on the west side of the river--in all, 169 guns--falling into our hands. Two steamers were burned or blown up, and there never was so clean a scoop made anywhere.

A timid man would have hesitated to attack these works by assault, no matter what assistance he may have had from other quarters, but General Terry never for an instant hesitated, and though I feel somewhat flattered at the confidence he reposed in my judgment, I am quite ready to believe that he acted on his own ideas of what was proper to be done in the matter and was perfectly qualified to judge without the advice of anyone.

Throughout this affair his conduct has been marked by the greatest desire to be successful, not for the sake of personal considerations, but for the cause in which we are all alike engaged.

I don't know that I ever met an officer who so completely gained my esteem and admiration.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C.

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Special report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U. S. Navy, commendatory of the conduct of Second Lieutenant Clemens, United States Signal Corps

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,
U. S. Flagship Malvern, off Fort Fisher, January 17, 1865.

SIR: Second Lieutenant W. W. Clemens, U.S. Signal Corps, was detailed, at my request, for a signal officer by the chief of that corps, to serve as signal officer on my staff. Mr. Clemens has taught the army code to at least one of the regular officers on board each ship that had them, which has enabled me often to communicate when naval signals would have been of no avail.

In addition, his services have been to me of the utmost importance; thoroughly collected and competent at all times and under any circumstances; gentlemanly in his deportment, intelligent, always ready and cheerful.

I hope you will at least send a copy of this to the honorable Secretary of War, that it may be placed on file as a slight evidence of my appreciation of him as an officer and gentleman.

Through Mr. Clemens I was in constant communication with General Terry, even during the assault on Fort Fisher, and was enabled to direct the fire of the New Ironsides to the traverses occupied by the enemy without fear of hurting our own people from my complete reliance on him.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

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Report of Lieutenant-Commander Breese, U.S. Navy, regarding the assault

FLAGSHIP MALVERN,
Off Fort Fisher, N. C., January 16, 1865.

SIR: I have to report that in obedience to your order I represented your flag in commanding the assault on Fort Fisher, and beg leave to state as follows:

Lieutenant S. W. Preston had charge of a force of about 10 men from each ship, with shovels and picks, and threw up within 600 yards of the fort a well-protected breastwork, and from that gradually advanced to within 200 yards a succession of rifle pits which were most promptly occupied by a line of skirmishers, composed of marines under Second Lieutenant L. E. Fagan, U.S. Marine Corps. The manner in which this work was done reflects most creditably upon Lieutenant Preston. As the advance was made he came to me and reported his work finished and asked that he might be employed in any way. Lieutenant Preston's services were most useful to me, and in his last moments he attempted to send me word that he had carried out my orders.

The assaulting party was composed of about 1,600 seamen and 400 marines, divided into four lines, as follows: First line, composed of marines, Captain L. L. Dawson, U.S. Marine Corps, commanding. Second line, composed of the landing party of the first and fourth divisions of the squadron, Lieutenant. Commander C. H. Cushman, commanding. Third line, composed of the landing party of the second division of the squadron, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander James Parker, who most generously waived his seniority upon reading your order that I should represent you on shore. Fourth line, composed of the landing party of the third division of the squadron, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander T. O. Selfridge. The second, third, and fourth lines were of about equal strength.

It was intended that the men should assault in line, the marines acting as sharpshooters, and the different lines were to charge over them, but from the difficulty I had of informing myself of the time when the army was to assault, which was to guide our movements, that moment found us too far off to move to the attack unless under cover. When I discovered that the army was moving to attack the fort, I ordered the men to advance by the flank along the beach, hoping to be able to form them for the assault under cover of the marines, but 400 yards distance, exposed to a most galling fire of musketry, threw a portion of the marines into the first line, and the rest of them did not take position as they should.

The second and third lines came along and the heads of the three lines joined and formed one compact column, which, filing up to the sea face of Fort Fisher, assaulted to within 50 yards of the parapet, which was lined with one dense mass of musketeers, who played sad havoc with our men. Although exposed to a most severe fire from the enemy, the men were rallied three times under the personal encouragement and exposure of their commanding officers, but failed to gain much ground. A few officers and men reached the parapet. I do not know their names, but they will doubtless be found in the reports of the officers accompanying the party.

The marines having failed to occupy their position, gave the enemy an almost unmolested fire upon us. Men armed with Sharps rifles and the few marines in the front, opened fire, but it was too feeble to be of avail. Finding the rear of the men retreating, I hastened toward it to form them under cover and have them use their rifles, but they were too far distant for me to reach them and I accordingly returned to a position near the works. As I did so, the remaining men, notwithstanding all attempts to stop them, fled, with the exception of about 60, among whom were Lieutenant-Commanders James Parker, C. H. Cushman, T. O. Selfridge, and M. Sicard, and Lieutenants N.H. Farquhar and R. H. Lamson, the latter of whom was wounded, and several volunteer officers whose names I unfortunately do not know.

The fire of the enemy was so severe that the few of our men remaining had to seek such cover as they could, and there remained until dark when a demonstration upon the part of the rebels induced all to make a rush, and most succeeded in escaping.

The country will regret the death of Lieutenant S. W. Preston, acting as my aid in carrying orders, who was killed in the front, and of Lieutenant B. H. Porter, killed in the early assault, at the head of the column, and of several volunteer officers, seamen, and marines, killed during the attack.

Of Assistant Surgeon William Longshaw, special mention should be made on account of his great bravery and attention to the wounded under the hottest fire, until finally he fell a victim in the very act of binding up the wounds of a marine.

I can but attribute the failure of the assault to the absence of the marines from their position, as their fire would have enabled our "boarders" to use their cutlasses and pistols most effectively. By this I would imply that [there was] the lack of proper organization, it being impossible in the short space of time, on account of throwing so many small squads of men from the different vessels together in one mass, lacking proper company formations and wholly unacquainted with each other, to secure such organization. This led to the confusion exhibited, for it was not due to any want of personal valor on the part of the officers or men.

Although the officers and men were exposed to a severe fire from the enemy, to them of a novel character and upon a novel element, which would have tried veterans, yet they advanced nobly, and the survivors must be satisfied that they contributed, in no small degree, to the success of the army. The enemy believing, as I am informed, that the main assault was to come from us, were much surprised upon looking to their rear, to find the army so far advanced in their works.

The medical officers sent on shore with the landing party established their field hospital at a work about a mile from the fort, where Assistant Surgeon B. H. Kidder took charge of the wounded, who were conveyed there and their wants attended to as well as circumstances would permit.

As near as I could estimate, there were about 65 killed and 200 wounded.

Lieutenant-Commander W. B. Cushing, in the extreme front, finding nothing could be done, left with the retreating men and succeeded finally in rallying them, and, at the request of General Terry, occupied the lines near his headquarters, which enabled him to withdraw men to reinforce his force in the fort.

Being a witness to the assault of the army after our repulse, I can not but express my admiration of the extreme gallantry of its attack. Where one act of personal bravery was displayed on the part of the enemy, a dozen or more were conspicuous on our part, and it was a most imposing sight to see how splendidly our brave soldiers did their work.

In conclusion, I would say that I may have omitted the names of officers who have distinguished themselves by their gallantry, yet I could not fail to mention those above named, who came personally under my notice, and I trust that the commanding officers of the assaulting lines will do justice to all.

Of Lieutenant-Commander James Parker, I would say that I was a witness to his efforts to advance his men, to the free exposure of his person, and although ranking me he would let no obstacle of that nature interpose and check his endeavor to do his utmost to capture the fort.

To your Secretary, Mr. C. P. Porter, acting as my aid, I am very much indebted. Though frequently sent to the rear with orders, he was mostly promptly back, and at the assault he was found at the front.

Although the assaulting party failed, I think it but due to those who advanced, and to the memories of the slain, to claim for them through their strong demonstration, a corresponding resistance from the enemy, and a weakening of the rebel defense toward our army.

I have been informed by officers who conversed with prisoners, that the enemy believed ours to be the main assault, and concentrated against us their main force.

In saying this, I would not wish to be understood in the least to detract from the splendid gallantry exhibited by our army, which was worthy of the highest commendation that can be bestowed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

K. R. BREESE,
Fleet Captain.

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,
Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.

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Report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U.S. Navy, transmitting report of Lieutenant-Commander Breese, regarding the deaths of Lieutenants Preston and Porter, U. S. Navy

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,
U. S. Flagship Malvern, Cape Fear River, February 1, 1865.

SIR: I enclose a communication from my fleet captain, Lieutenant-Commander K. R. Breese, in relation to the lamented Lieutenants Preston and Porter, who fell together before the walls of Fort Fisher and while trying to plant the Union colors on the enemy's ramparts.

No eulogy passed on these two gallant men could do them full justice. To me they had both endeared themselves by their noble qualities, and in their deaths I feel as if I had lost two members of my own family. Their names and gallant deeds will long be remembered by their associates in arms, and the memory of their heroic gallantry will inspire future heroes to emulate their conduct. The officers of the squadron propose to erect a monument at Annapolis to the memory of the gallant dead, but their memories will live in history long after the stone that records their deeds has crumbled into dust.

I must not omit to pay a just tribute to the memory of the noble Assistant Surgeon William Longshaw, who was shot dead near the enemy's works while engaged in an act of mercy, binding up the wounds of a sailor, and of the gallant Acting Assistant Surgeon John Blackruer, who fell and died in the same way. Nor must I omit the name of Acting Ensign Robert Wiley, who died fighting manfully and endeavoring to reach the enemy's parapets.

They all died like heroes, and the nation is as much bound to mourn their loss as those who have held higher positions.

They are all regretted deeply here, and their names will all be forever associated with one of the most gallant attacks ever made on a powerful fortress.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C.

[Enclosure.]

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,
U.S. Flagship Malvern, off Fort Fisher, January 18, 1865.

ADMIRAL: In my last report of the assault on Fort Fisher I have scarcely mentioned the names and services of Lieutenant S.W. Preston, your flag-lieutenant, and Lieutenant B. H. Porter, your flag-captain, thinking that by a little delay I might the more do justice, yet I seem to feel that impossible in me.

Preston, after accomplishing most splendidly the work assigned him by you, which was both dangerous and laborious, under constant fire, came to me as my aid for orders, showing no flagging of spirit or body, and returning from the rear, whither he had been sent, fell among the foremost at the front, as he had lived, the thorough embodiment of a United States naval officer.

Porter, conspicuous by his figure and uniform as well as by his great gallantry, claimed the right to lead the headmost column with the Malvern's men he had taken with him, carrying your flag, and fell at its very head.

Two more noble spirits the world never saw, nor had the Navy ever two more intrepid men. Young, talented, and handsome, the bravest of the brave, pure in their lives, surely their names deserve something more than a passing mention and are worthy to be handed down to posterity with the greatest and best of naval heroes.

Were you not so well acquainted with their characters, I should deem it my duty to speak of their high merits, but as chief of your staff, to which they belonged, I must speak of their wonderful singleness of purpose to do their whole duty, always most cheerful and willing, desirous of undertaking anything which might redound to the credit of the service, giving me at all times the most ready assistance in my duties, combining with their intelligence a ready perception as to the best mode of accomplishing their orders, the country has lost two such servants as could illy be spared, and your staff its brightest ornaments.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

K. R. BREESE,
Fleet Captain, North Atlantic Squadron.

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,
Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.

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Unofficial letter from Lieutenant Lamson, U.S. Navy, to Commander Rhind, U. S. Navy, regarding the death of Lieutenant Preston

U.S.S. GETTYSBURG,
Off Fort Fisher, January 16, 1865.

DEAR CAPTAIN RHIND: You will no doubt learn the good news of our victory and the sad, sad tidings of Preston's death before this reaches you; but as he was shot by my side I thought you would like to know some of the particulars of the fall of one whom we all loved and admired so much, and whom I knew was sincerely attached to you.

The storming party from the fleet was landed about 2 miles from the fort before noon, and Mr. Preston had charge of an advanced force with shovels to throw up some rifle pits so that we could approach as near as possible without being exposed to the enemy's fire. About 3 p.m. the signal was made for the assault, and Mr. Preston was near the head of the column. We advanced along the beach near the water till we had reached the palisades, where we turned straight for the sea face of the fort, the army assaulting on the left flank and rear of the fort about the same time.

The fleet now ceased firing, and in an instant the entire front of the fort was lined with riflemen, who, secure behind the breastworks, poured a terrible fire into us, and we received grape and canister at the same time from the Mound and the other batteries.

The men still pressed forward, and when near the palisades Mr. Preston was struck in the left thigh or groin, the femoral artery being severed. He fell forward, and one of the men stooped to assist him and was shot, falling on Mr. Preston. Some one pulled him off, and Mr. Preston turned over on his back and soon expired. I had got forward some twenty paces more, when I was knocked down by a shot through the left arm and shoulder. I arose again and got up nearer the parapet, when I fell from loss of blood and exhaustion.

The officers were all doing their utmost to get the men forward, but the hopelessness of attempting to get over the palisades, ditch, and the steep parapet was apparent, and the men fell so fast that every formation was instantly broken; still I think we would have made a more desperate effort if so many of the leading officers had not been killed or wounded. Our men fell back, taking many wounded with them, but leaving the ground covered with the dead, dying, and wounded. As soon as I could get a bandage round my arm to stop the flow of blood I started to crawl to Preston to see if I could do anything for him, but a wounded man near him called to me that he was dead. Poor fellow, it made my heart sick to see him stretched out on the sand, and I mourned him, not only as a dear friend lost, but as a loss to the service of the most superior young officer I have ever seen in it.

In the meantime the army carried almost without resistance five traverses on the left, for Colonel Lamb says he thought ours the main attack and had most all the garrison to meet us.

The fleet opened fire again over us, who were lying under the parapet, and the army took one traverse after another till the rebels surrendered. The army officers say freely that they never could have got into the fort had it not been for our assault on the sea face drawing the garrison to that side. Looking down from the parapet now I do not wonder we did not get up, especially as we had no sharpshooters to cover us to keep the rebels from using their muskets so freely. Captain Breese commanded the assault, and did everything a brave and good officer could have done under the circumstances. Lieutenant-Commander Cushman <nor11_451>was wounded slightly in the leg. Lieutenant Porter, of the Malvern, killed near Preston, shot through the left breast, and many other officers wounded. I do not know our loss, but it can not be much less than 200 or 250.

My wound is only through the flesh of the arm and shoulder and is doing well.

The fort is stronger even than we thought, and nothing but the severe bombardment and the desperate assaults could have taken it.

I am sure no one will be more rejoiced than yourself at the victory after the desperate risk you ran to destroy it, and you are often spoken of in connection with the fall of Fort Fisher, and many wishes are expressed that you could have been here at the time. Mr. Preston left a note saying he wished his remains to be interred at Annapolis, there to rest, and they have been sent there in charge of an officer.

I have lost 2 officers and 4 men killed and have 6 wounded.

With high respect, I remain, very truly, yours,

R. H. LAMSON.

Commander A. C. RHIND, U. S. Navy.

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Report of Lieutenant-Commander Breese, U.S. Navy, calling attention to special acts of gallantry

FLAGSHIP MALVERN,
Cape Fear River, January 28, 1865.

ADMIRAL: In my report of the assault of Fort Fisher I did not mention the fact of Lieutenant-Commander Cushman being wounded, as he made so light of the affair, and did not wish to be included amongst those mentioned as such. Since I have learned that Lieutenant-Commander Cushman's wound was more severe than I had even thought, and I think it but right that I should mention that, though in this condition and very much fatigued from his efforts of the day, being relieved by darkness from the fire of the fort, he collected together the men of his column and posted them in the lines occupied by us that night, requiring a great exertion and constant movement until 2 a.m. the following morning.

I also would wish to bring to your notice the conduct of a young lad of the Wabash, named Myers, who three several times left a good protection from the fire of the enemy and went to the assistance of wounded men and under fire carried them to the friendly shelter of his hole in the sand, and this within a hundred yards of Fort Fisher.

I had hoped to obtain the name of a very brave and gallant officer of the Vanderbilt who led their assaulting party, but have been unable to do so. This officer was conspicuous for his gallantry, and most richly deserves special mention.

I would also wish to say that Acting Lieutenant-Commander Danels, of the Vanderbilt, suffering from ill health and unable to keep up with the assaulting party, rendered much valuable assistance in rallying the men and in caring for the wounded.

I regret that my personal acquaintance with the many brave officers and men around me on that day was so slight that I could not even recognize to what ships they belonged, except in the instances named, and that necessarily I have failed to mention particularly some who I saw behaved splendidly, and have trusted to the commanding officers of columns to name others.

I wish also to bear witness to the handsome manner in which Lieutenant Fagan, of the Marine Corps, did his duty with his sharpshooters, and to the gallantry he exhibited in advancing his men so close to the enemy's works.

An additional regret I feel in the loss of Flag-Lieutenant Preston, who could so much better have done justice, that it devolves upon me to mention how well the officers and men behaved engaged in digging rifle pits, and of the bravery evinced by many of them in advancing under a perfectly exposed fire to within 300 yards of the fort and digging their pits under fire. A number were killed and wounded in the undertaking.

Although these men had been hard at work all day and were told by Lieutenant Preston that they were not expected to join in the assault, I know of scarcely any who had arms that did not join it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

K. R. BREESE,
Fleet Captain.

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,
Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.

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Report of Rear-Admiral Porter, U. S. Navy, in commendation of officers of his command

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,
U. S. Flagship Malvern, Cape Fear River, January 28, 1865.

SIR: After such an engagement and success as this fleet has met with, I think it due to the officers engaged to mention those particularly who, in my opinion, deserve the commendation of the Department or merit promotion.

I did not think it well to mention these matters in my late official dispatch, as such reports seldom or never give satisfaction to officers or their friends, and give rise more often to heartburnings and jealousies which it is desirable to avoid on an occasion like this. It is no easy matter for a commander in chief to do full justice to all concerned, but I will endeavor to do so to the best of my ability, without partiality to any one beyond what I must naturally feel toward those who have given me their warmest support on this occasion.

I trust I need not remind the Department that our success here has in material and forts been greater than on any other occasion during this war.

I trust that some promotions will grow out of this, if only to show the officers that there is reward in store for those who do the fighting.

First and foremost on the list of commodores is Commodore H. K. Thatcher, full of honest zeal and patriotism; his vessel was always ready for action, and when he did go into it, his ship was handled with admirable skill. No vessel in the squadron was so much cut up as the Colorado, for some reason the rebels selecting her for a target. I believe Commodore Thatcher would have fought his ship until she went to the bottom, and went into the fight with a full determination to conquer or die. There is no reward too great for this gallant officer; he has shown the kind of ability naval leaders should possess--a love of fighting and an invincible courage.

Commodore Joseph Lanman, commanding the Minnesota, was selected to lead the line, his vessel being the slowest and least manageable; consequently he led into action, except on an occasion when the Colorado took his place.

I was much pleased with the manner in which he handled his ship and fired throughout the action, the whole affair on his part being conducted with admirable judgment and coolness. I recommend him to the consideration of the Department as one on whom they can place the utmost reliance, place him in any position.

Commodore S. W. Godon, commanding the Susquehanna, is an unusually intelligent officer, and who does not need to be told a second time where to go in time of action. This is the second important affair in which he has been engaged during this war, in both of which he has acquitted himself in the most handsome manner. His ship was beautifully handled, and impressed me with her good discipline and accurate firing. To me personally he has given his warmest support, and I should fail in my duty if I did not give him the full credit he deserved. His conduct throughout this harassing affair has met my warmest approbation, and I think he is one of those who merit promotion when the Government thinks proper to reward those who have borne the brunt of battle.

Commodore James F. Schenck and his vessel, the Powhatan, have come up to my expectations in every respect. This officer in battle has shown himself worthy to command so fine a ship. He performed his duty most faithfully, and I am proud not only to have had him under my command, but to see him reinstated in the position to which he has done so much credit. He deserves all I can say of him, and is worthy of promotion.

Commodore William Radford, in command of that noble ship, the Ironsides, and also in command of the division of monitors, gained my warmest admiration by his conduct throughout this affair. He has shown abilities of a very high character, not only in fighting and maneuvering his vessel, but in taking care of his division. Ready at all times for battle and eager to go into the fight alone, he performed admirably when his guns were brought to bear on the enemy. His vessel did more execution than any vessel in the fleet, and even when our troops were on the parapet 1 had so much confidence in the accuracy of his fire that he was directed to fire on the traverses in advance of our troops and clear them out. This he did most effectually, and but for this victory might not have been ours. Having broken his rudder in a heavy gale, he rigged up a temporary one under adverse circumstances, and had his ship ready as soon as the rest. He seemed never to tire of fighting, and for three days laid within 1,000 yards of Fort Fisher without moving his anchor, and made the rebels feel that we came there to stay. Under all and every circumstance Commodore Radford has acquired an enviable reputation, and is deserving of the greatest promotion that can be given him.

Captain James Alden, commanding the Brooklyn, has been near me, and at times associated with me, during this war. He had already done enough to deserve promotion before the commencement of operations before Fort Fisher, but if the matter was at any time doubtful, he certainly has earned promotion now. Always leading heretofore, or assisting with all his energies, he has been engaged in all the successful attacks on forts. His aid to me on this late occasion has been very valuable. Always intelligent and energetic, he never had to be told to get ready; he always kept ready; he anticipated, which is a quality very desirable in an officer, and without which he can not be expected to be very useful. His vessel was always in the right place and at the right time, and when his batteries opened, no frigate could do more execution. I have spoken before of the high qualities of this officer. I consider him able and worthy to fill the highest rank, and I know that the Government has no one in its Navy more full of energy, zeal, or intelligence in his profession. I shall feel much disappointed if Captain Alden is not promoted to a rank he has won more than once during this rebellion. I am sure the Department will appreciate all I have said of this gallant officer; his record speaks for him.

Captain Melancton Smith, in the Wabash, has performed his duty well. He has also made a good record at the Department, and has been actively engaged in fighting since the rebellion first broke out. His old ship has done good service here, and if he had done nothing more than assist, as he has done in the capture of this place, he deserves promotion, which I hereby recommend.

I also recommend Captain Charles Steedman, commanding Ticonderoga, and Captain D. B. Ridgley, commanding Shenandoah; though commanding smaller vessels than the others, and less effective in their fire, did the best they could. This is the second important affair Captain Steedman has been in, and Captain Ridgley has been very energetic during the war against blockade runners. I recommend them both for promotion.

Lieutenant-Commander K. R. Breese, my fleet captain, has been with me nearly all the time since the rebellion broke out. In command of a division of a mortar fleet which opened the way to New Orleans, he made his first record there. In the Mississippi with me for two years, engaged in harassing and dangerous duty, he always acquitted himself to my satisfaction. In charge of the mortars at the siege of Vicksburg, he helped to hasten the surrender of that stronghold. At Fort Fisher he led the boarders in the assault, and though we were not successful in getting into the works in the face of equal numbers, yet that assault gained the day, as is generally admitted on every side; our troops obtained a footing without much resistance, and then nobly maintained what they had won. Lieutenant-Commander Breese did all that he could to rally his men, and made two or three unsuccessful attempts to regain the parapet, but the marines having failed in their duty to support the gallant officers and sailors who took the lead, he had to retire to a place of safety. He did not, however, leave the ground, but remained under the parapet in a rifle pit using a musket until night favored his escape. He is a clever, gallant officer, and I strongly recommend his immediate promotion to a commander.

I also recommend the promotion of Lieutenant-Commander H. A. Adams, jr., without whose services we should have been brought to a standstill more than once; he volunteered for anything and everything.

The following officers who volunteered to lead their men in the assault on Fort Fisher deserve particular notice. These officers volunteered for the service, and undertook what was considered by the Regular Army the forlorn hope of the assault. Nowhere in the annals of war have officers and sailors undertaken so desperate a service, and one which was deemed impossible by a former general, and an engineer having a high reputation in the service. Twenty-one officers were killed and wounded in this service, and 20 officers and 60 men were kept for four hours under fire from the enemies' sharpshooters, not being able to escape until night set in. The courage of these officers deserves the highest reward. Their efforts, though unsuccessful, gained the day, as the enemy considered this the main attack and brought superior numbers from a superior position to bear on it. The names of some of these officers will be found on record on the files of the Department, amongst which those of Lieutenant-Commander T. O. Selfridge and Lieutenant George M. Bache will be found most conspicuous. I recommend that Lieutenant-Commander James Parker, Lieutenant-Commander T. O. Selfridge, Lieutenant. Commander C. H. Cushman, Lieutenant R. H. Lamson, and Lieutenant George M. Bache be promoted. The three latter were severely wounded.

Though the marines did not do their duty, Captain L. L. Dawson, Captain George Butler, and Second Lieutenants William Wallace, Charles F. Williams, and Louis E. Fagan were found in the front and fought gallantly. I recommend them to the favorable notice of the Department.

To Captain O. S. Glisson, commanding Santiago de Cuba, I am particularly indebted for his zeal in covering the troops, landing guns, and taking his division into action, and to Captain B. F. Sands, commanding the Fort Jackson,, for performing the different duties he was called on to perform. I recommend them both for promotion.

I refer you to Captain Glisson's report in relation to the commanding officers in his division. I also recommend to the Department Lieutenant-Commander T. S. Phelps, in command of the Juniata.

Lieutenant-Commander J. H. Upshur, in the A. D. Vance, had charge of the reserves, and was employed night and day in landing army stores and guns, and covering the troops from the rebels outside of our lines. His guns did good execution, and though his duties prevented him from participating in the attack on the forts, I can not withhold his name, and recommend him for advancement. I recommend that Commander E.G. Parrott, commanding the Monadnock; Commander E. R. Colhoun, commanding the Saugus; Lieutenant. Commander A. W. Weaver, commanding the Mahopac, and Lieutenant-Commander George E. Belknap, be promoted. These officers have given a world-renowned name to the monitors, and have shown what they were capable of performing when properly placed and managed. They had the hardest part of the work, and there is no end to their energy, bravery, and untiring zeal.

I can draw no distinction between the following officers, whom I recommend for promotion. They were under fire most all the time, and at close quarters, and coolly performed what was required of them:

Lieutenant-Commander W. T. Truxtun, commanding the Tacony; Lieutenant-Commander P. G. Watmough, commanding the Kansas; Lieutenant-Commander F. M. Ramsay, commanding the Unadilla; Lieutenant-Commander D. L. Braille, commanding the Pequot; Lieutenant-Commander Ralph Chandler, commanding the Maumec; Lieutenant-Commander M. Sicard, commanding the Seneca; Commander J. H. Spotts, commanding the Pawtuxet; Lieutenant-Commander W. G. Temple, commanding the Pontoosuc; Lieutenant-Commander T. C. Harris, commanding the Yantic; Commander J. C. Howell, commanding the Nereus; Commander D. Ammen, commanding the Mohican Commander J. C. Beaumont, commanding the Mackinaw; Commander J. M. B. Clitz, commanding the Osceola; Lieutenant-Commander J. L. Davis, commanding the Sassacus; Lieutenant-Commander E. E. Potter, commanding the Chippewa; Lieutenant W. B. Cushing, commanding the Monticello; Commander S. D. Trenchard, commanding the Rhode Island; Acting Volunteer Lieutenant A. R. Langthorne, commanding the Alabama; Acting Volunteer Lieutenant T. C. Dunn, commanding the Montgomery.

I also recommend for promotion Acting Master S. P. Crafts, commanding the Little Ada; Acting Master J. H. Porter, commanding the Nansemond; Acting Master E. S. Keyser, commanding the Eolus, for gallant conduct throughout the action. Also Acting Volunteer Lieutenant John MacDiarmid, commanding Governor Buckingham.

I must refer you to the reports of different commanders for recommendations of those under their command, as it would be impossible for me to know anything in relation to them. When it is remembered that the surrender of the defenses of Cape Fear River is one of the most, if not the most, important events of the war, in which the largest stronghold of the enemy was captured under adverse circumstances, the justice of promotion will be seen. Its importance will be soon felt in the fall of Richmond, to which it is as necessary now as the main artery is to the human system.

I trust the Department will be liberal in its promotions. This is almost a naval affair entirely, for the idea originated in the Navy Department, and until the reputation of the Army became in danger of being reflected upon, we met from that branch of the service little or no encouragement. Few promotions have taken place during this war, and it would be gratifying to the friends of all concerned to see the advancement of those who have worked so patiently for three years and have made so handsome a denouement.

I have heard a matter freely discussed amongst the officers, to which I beg leave to draw the attention of the Department. A distribution of medals to officers would be a most popular thing; this is so common a thing amongst modern nations, and so universally accepted as a reward for eminent services among officers and men, that I recommend its adoption in our naval service.

Anyone who has seen the pride with which sailors wear the medals bestowed upon them for gallant conduct can readily imagine how grateful it would be to officers. Trifling as such a mere bauble may be in intrinsic value, yet the history of war tells how valuable they are as inducements to perform gallant deeds. I trust the Department won't think me presuming in recommending what, no doubt, they already intend to adopt.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral.

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C.

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